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Preface 
 
The purpose of this research paper is three-
fold. Firstly, I will trace the origins and jusifi-
cation of cost-benefit analysis in moral and 
political philosophy. Secondly, I will present 
some of the basic features of cost-benefit 
analysis as a planning tool. Thirdly, I will bring 
special attention to some of the main ethical 
difficulties which one is inevitably faced with 
when using cost-benefit analysis as a plan-
ning tool. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (or, as it is usually 
called in the U.S.: benefit-cost analysis) is not 
an altogether unambiguous concept. To be-
gin with one can distinguish between two 
kinds of cost-benefit analysis. On the one 
hand, there is the specifically economic kind 
of analysis, which emerged together with mi-
croeconomics and neoclassical economics 
during the 19th century. In this case the value 
or significance of everything needs to be ex-
pressed in monetary terms and based on 
(actual or virtual) market values. On the other 
hand, there is a broader kind of analysis, 
which is not exclusively economic in this 
sense, but includes assessments with at least 
some descriptions of costs and benefits ex-
pressed in non-economic and qualitative 
terms.  
 
In general, though, cost-benefit analysis re-
fers to the quantitative economic kind of 
analysis. Even then, however, it is necessary 
to distinguish between two approaches to the 
valuation procedure (Campen 1986, 26f). On 
the one hand, there is the “conventional” ap-
proach, which sees cost-benefit analysis as 
applied welfare economics with its standard 
valuation techniques. On the other hand, 
there is the “decision-making” approach, 
which holds that the actual decision-makers 
should influence evaluations related to con-
troversial parameters like, for instance, risk 
and uncertainty, the relative weight attached 
to the interests of different social groups, or 
non-economic elements like loss of human 
lives, irreversible environmental impacts, etc. 
The conventional approach, where the ana-
lyst takes on the role of a neutral expert who 
only relies on mainstream economic methods 
and principles like efficiency and maximiza-
tion of economic benefits, is the most com-
monly used of the two. 
 
Thirdly, one can distinguish between private 
and public cost-benefit analysis. In the first 
case the point of view is the private company 
or consumer, and only the company’s or con-
sumer’s own interests are relevant. In public 
cost-benefit analysis, on the other hand, the 
point of view is the public at large, wherefore 
all interests become relevant.  
 
Public costs-benefit analyses can either take 
a local, national or global point of view. In the 
first two cases only a specific group of inter-
ests are included, whereas the last kind takes 
account of all interests on an equal basis. 
Again, in general, cost-benefit analysis refers 
to economic evaluations of public projects 
and policies, and more often than not from a 
national point of view where only the coun-
try’s own citizens have standing (Boardman 
et al., 43f). 
 
Fourthly, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween ex ante and ex post cost benefit analy-
ses. Most cost-benefit analyses are com-
pleted before (ex ante) a decision is made 
about a certain project or policy. It can also 
be made afterwards (ex post), however, in or-
Part I: Origins and basic design 
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der to make sure whether the decision was 
economically sound (or whether the previous 
ex ante analysis was reliable), or it can be re-
vised continuously along with the execution of 
the decided project or policy (in medias res).  
 
Finally, cost-benefit analysis needs to be dis-
tinguished from cost-effectiveness analysis. 
The purpose of cost-benefit analysis is to 
analyse a project or policy in order to deter-
mine, whether it is (or has been, or will be) a 
good investment. In this sense, it evaluates 
and recommends policies.  
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis, on the other 
hand, aims at analysing how an already de-
cided policy can be (or whether it has been) 
implemented in the most economically effec-
tive way, or how a certain amount of money 
can be used most effectively for a general 
purpose. The more general this purpose is, 
the less the difference will be between cost-
benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. If the 
decided policy is as unspecified as “more en-
vironment for the money,” or “more happiness 
for the money,” the two kinds of analysis 
more or less merge into one. 
 
From moral and political 
philosophy to  
cost-benefit assessment 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is usually conceived of 
as a sub-department of welfare economics 
which again is a sub-department of ethics. 
Or, to be more precise: cost-benefit analysis 
is a tool that is assumed to support ethical 
and political decisions by using a specific set 
of simplified assumptions. To understand how 
it works it is worth taking a look at its origins 
in ethical and political philosophy and detect 
which elements are preserved and which 
were left out.  
 
The antique origin 
 
“Every state is a community of some kind, 
and every community is established with a 
view to some good; (…) the state or political 
community, which is the highest of all, and 
which embraces all the rest, aims at (…) the 
highest good.” This is how Aristotle’s opens 
his treatise on politics (Aristotle 1962), which, 
directly or indirectly, has been a basic refer-
ence for all subsequent theories of politics. It 
is also the classical formulation of teleology 
or consequentialism in politics: what politics 
and, consequently, political science, are pri-
marily about is furthering the highest good.  
 
But what, then, is the highest good? Appar-
ently, everybody seems to agree that at least 
one thing is good in itself and not just for the 
sake of something else, namely happiness, 
eudaimonia, and “identify living well and do-
ing well with being happy” (Aristotle 1954, 
1095a). The supreme good of a state is, ac-
cordingly, to make everybody live well and 
act well.  
 
However, when trying to define happiness 
more precisely, people often tend to disagree. 
Most people believe that it is something plain 
and obvious, like “pleasure, wealth, or hon-
our.” Their opinions often differ from one an-
other, though, and often even the same man 
identifies it with different things in different 
parts of his life (Aristotle 1954, 1095a). It 
seems necessary, then, to study it more care-
fully in order to make more considerate politi-
cal decisions. This is what Aristotle did in his 
ethics, and before leaving him it seems ap-
propriate to bring attention to a few of the 
main points, which are of particular interest in 
relation to cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Firstly, Aristotle draw attention to the fact that 
happiness is primarily a consequence of do-
ing good, of acting in accordance with virtues 
like justice, courage, temperance, friendli-
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ness, generosity, reflectivity, wisdom, good 
judgement, etc., rather than simply the result 
of being wealthy or of living a life of ease and 
luxury. The good life is a life of virtue and 
substance.  
 
Consequently, the first goal of politics cannot 
be merely to promote satisfaction, understood 
simply as transitory subjective feelings of 
pleasure – whatever may have caused these 
feelings – but rather to encourage virtuous 
actions. We should never be too hard on our-
selves, though, and try to turn our back to all 
the material goods, which can make our lives 
more pleasant, while striving for perfection. 
“Virtuous and liberal” is the appropriate for-
mula placing us midway between a life too 
easy and a life too hard (Aristotle 1962, 69f).  
 
Secondly, the happiness of a person or of a 
community cannot be measured simply by 
aggregating all the single instances of feel-
ings one happens to have throughout one’s 
life. A human life is a closely knit unity, not a 
collection of separable anecdotes. All the ac-
tions and incidents a person performs and ex-
periences throughout his or her life are tied 
together into one single narrative, which we 
try to make as meaningful as possible.  
 
Thirdly, because people have different quali-
ties and capacities, they differ in their specific 
aims. There is not one specific model of the 
good life which fits all. Different lives suit dif-
ferent people. The state should not strive for 
complete unity, as Plato recommended in his 
Republic, and “reduce harmony to unison and 
rhythm to a single beat,” as Aristotle puts it 
(Aristotle 1954, 65). On the contrary, plurality, 
diversity and an appropriate balance between 
the different parts is what keeps the political 
community alive (Aristotle 1962, 57). This 
calls for some kind of democracy, because 
the many together provides a broader, more 
sensitive and differentiated view than the few, 
no matter how clever these few may be, for a 
certain amount of private ownership or rights 
of use, and for exchange of goods (on mar-
kets or elsewhere), in order for everybody to 
be able to concentrate on the areas where he 
or she performs best. 
 
Fourthly, however, even though the use of 
money can be a very powerful device in the 
effort to establish a good life, because it 
makes a division of labour possible and to-
gether with this a diversity of goods and an 
increased production all around (Aristotle 
1962, 63), money should never be treated as 
an end in itself. We should therefore be care-
ful not to let money-making, chrematistike, 
take its own course independent of the aims 
in the general household balancing, oiko-
nomike, and “turn all qualities into money-
making qualities, as though that were the end 
and everything had to serve that 
end” (Aristotle 1962, 45). In this case we 
would become slaves of a limitless desire, 
which can never be satisfied. Likewise, ex-
cessive greed and excessive inequalities 
could very easily damage the friendly ties, 
which hold societies together, and which form 
the strongest source of happiness.  
 
Aristotle’s highly influential reflections on the 
good life and its political implications were ad-
dressed to the general public of citizens. This 
is the forum which was most suited to deter-
mine the outcome of communal affairs on the 
basis of common deliberation. The weighing 
of opposing interests and obligations could 
thus be made by the citizens themselves, giv-
ing due respect to the arguments and opin-
ions of the most well-informed and the most 
virtuous – just, temperate, wise, careful, and 
patient – men amongst them. Due to the 
qualitative differentiation of happiness, Aris-
totle never even thought of specifying a fool-
proof method for determining the best out-
come in complex ethical and political matters. 
Methods could never substitute for rational 
dialogue and virtuous judgment. 
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 Quantifying ethics 
 
Even though substitution may not have been 
their final ambition, many philosophers and 
economists in Europe during the 19th century 
did try to give methodology a much more 
prominent position in ethics. This is what 
turned into welfare economics and, later on, 
cost-benefit analysis. When looked upon in 
retrospect, the first steps were taken as early 
as the 17th Century – inspired, to some ex-
tent, by the antique writer Epicurus and his 
followers (Epicurus 1994).  
 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the 
city state, the polis, was replaced by the 
much larger territorial state as the main politi-
cal unit, making the differences amongst citi-
zens more significant and political delibera-
tion about the common good and the qualita-
tive differentiation of happiness more difficult 
(cf., among others, Dahl 1989).  
 
Secondly, the market had expanded during 
the previous centuries to a scale which out-
matched Aristotle’s own experiences, devel-
oping new habits of comparing qualitatively 
different things quantitatively on the basis of a 
common denominator. Business became 
more marked off from custom and other con-
cerns, and the rights of individuals against 
each others and against the community were 
more sharply defined (cf. also Marshall 
1920/1946, 5). 
 
Thirdly, the success of quantitative and 
mathematical physics and mechanics in the 
wake of the scientific revolution installed a 
new pattern of inquiry as a serious competitor 
to the dominant Aristotelian model which, due 
to its intrinsic connection to a qualitative end 
perfectionist worldview, resisted quantitative 
operationalization. A “Mechanique Sociale” 
were expected one day to be placed next to 
the “Mechanique Celeste” (Edgeworth 1881, 
12), the theory of economy next to the sci-
ence of statistical mechanics (Jevons 1871, 
viii). 
 
However, the ambition of finding a quantita-
tive method of ethics may never have turned 
up, nor been fulfilled without the acceptance 
of two basic inventions. The first of these 
were the identification of new candidates for 
the role as common denominator. The Aristo-
telian ‘happiness’ and ‘highest good’ ap-
peared too complex, qualitatively coloured 
and impossible to operationalize in any sim-
ple, straightforward way.  
 
Instead, a set of apparently neutral and, in 
principle, much easier quantifiable concepts 
were introduced – by British authors like Tho-
mas Hobbes (Hobbes 1651/1968) and David 
Hume (Hume 1751/1966 & 1748/1972) – 
along with a neutralisation of the concept of 
‘happiness’ itself: human beings were now 
seen as machine-like creatures driven by 
blind ‘passions,’ ‘desires,’ and ‘appetites,’ 
seeking ‘power’ and ‘utility,’ in order to obtain 
‘pleasure,’ ‘delight’ and ‘welfare’ (or driven by 
‘aversion’ in order to avoid ‘displeasure’ and 
‘pain’). 
 
In the theories of these authors the good be-
came synonymous with that which gives the 
greatest subjective pleasure (or the least 
pain), no matter how it may be obtained, or 
with what is most useful in achieving the de-
sired pleasure or avoiding the undesired pain. 
Human beings were conceived primarily as 
pleasure-machines, as the British economist 
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth later put it (Edge-
worth 1881, 15), and reason were seen as a 
calculative instrument the main role of which 
where to maximize the satisfaction of the sub-
jective passions by refining them into 
(economic) interests (Hirschman 1977). 
 
The second invention, which came along with 
the first, was the introduction of a simple and 
easy to work with two-sided image of human 
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 beings. On the one hand humans were 
viewed as primarily selfish individuals seeking 
their own utility or pleasure out of “self-love” 
and in opposition to everybody else. Instead 
of a community conceived of as an expanded 
friendship – this was Aristotle’s model – the 
new image was one of a “private soci-
ety” (Rawls 1972, 521f) of self-interested con-
sumers without any truly committing bonds 
(family, friendships, social unions, or commu-
nities) between them. Society was believed to 
be kept together only by an unspoken con-
tract based on mutual advantage, where insti-
tutionally secured stability of life, liberty and 
possession in the form of private property be-
came an overruling goal.  
 
On the other hand, however, the very same 
individuals were seen to have a more or less 
developed “general benevolence” or 
“humanity” or “sympathy with public inter-
est” (Hume 1748/1972, 229; Hume 1751/-
1966, 54, 67, 109ff), which – once private 
property is secured – moves them beyond the 
narrowest kind of self-interest, and sees use-
fulness in a broader perspective: “Usefulness 
is agreeable, and engages our approbation 
(…) But, useful? For what? For somebody’s 
interest, surely. Whose interest, then? Not 
our own only: For our approbation frequently 
extends farther. It must, therefore, be the in-
terest of those, who are served by the char-
acter or action approved of; and these we 
may conclude, however remote, are not to-
tally indifferent to us” (Hume 1751/1966, 52). 
Not that they were expected to further a com-
mon good, understood as something sepa-
rate from all the private interests. Useful for 
all meant useful for all separately. 
 
The goal of society could thus be reformu-
lated into maximizing private utility, which in 
turn could be equalled to maximizing pleas-
ure and minimizing pain. This is exactly what 
Jeremy Bentham recommended in his fa-
mous dictum of hedonistic utilitarianism: the 
Principle of Utility (or Principle of Greatest 
Happiness), according to which every action 
should be judged by its tendency to contrib-
ute to the greatest possible “benefit, advan-
tage, pleasure, good or happiness” (Bentham 
1789/1996, 12), where happiness and the 
good is simply identified with subjective 
states of pleasure (and absence of pain), and 
where the interest of the community is noth-
ing but “the sum of the interests of the several 
members who compose it” (ibid.).  
 
Aristotle’s complex consequentialism was 
thus reduced to welfarism. As self-seeking in-
dividuals everybody is expected to try to 
maximize his or her own personal pleasure 
and minimize his or her own personal pain; 
as moral, altruistic and benevolent persons 
they try to act in a way, which maximizes the 
total sum of pleasure or minimizes the total 
sum of pain.  
 
The total value of an action is a function of 
the number of pleasurable subjective states it 
is expected to cause in each individual, multi-
plied by their intensities, durations and cer-
tainties, and adjusted for their relative propin-
quity or remoteness in time (Bentham 
1789/1996, 38). If, for instance, we were to 
choose between three possible future states 
from an altruistic point of view, as in Figure 1 
(next page), we ought to compare the conse-
quences for individuals and select the one 
with the greatest sum – in this case State I. 
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From political economy to economics 
 
This hedonistic utilitarian scheme was not al-
together satisfying, though. Firstly, the an-
tagonistic opposition between the selfish and 
the altruistic side of human beings seemed, 
theoretically as well as in practical moral life, 
to be an unsatisfactory compromise, particu-
larly as operationalization became an overrid-
ing goal.  
 
The Scottish professor of Moral Philosophy 
Adam Smith was therefore celebrated for fi-
nally having cut this Gordian knot theoreti-
cally by uniting the two sides of human be-
ings by help of “the invisible hand” operating 
behind the backs of the actors on the market 
(Smith 1776/1970; Smith 1790/1976, 184f): “It 
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own in-
terest. We address ourselves, not to their hu-
manity, but to their self-love, and never talk to 
them of our own necessities but of their ad-
vantages” (Smith 1776/1970, 119). At least in 
their “economic life” – not necessarily in fam-
ily life or religious life – humans appear to be 
selfishly calculating creatures. A most unfor-
tunate fate, one may think, but due to the har-
monic world order provided by the “all-wise 
Architect and Conductor” the selfish behav-
iour of all unintentionally turns out to result in 
consequences, which any impartial moral 
spectator would endorse as beneficial to all.  
 
Without any sign of “human wisdom, which 
foresees and intends,” general affluence oc-
curs in societies where “the propensity to 
truck, barter and exchange one thing for an-
other” (Smith 1776/1970, 117). Behind the 
backs of the agents private vices turn into 
public benefits, as the French author Bernard 
Mandeville put it in his Fable of the Bees. 
Adam Smith assumed, as did all of his follow-
ers, that if the market were left to work on its 
own without public interference, a balance or 
equilibrium would occur automatically – a bal-
ance, even, which could never be exceeded 
by human planning. Public interference 
should therefore only be considered in cases 
where the market for some reason failed to 
do a proper job.  
 
Smith did not really make away with the dis-
tinction between selfishness and moral justifi-
cation, though. He rather transformed it from 
a series of individual dilemmas to a general 
societal one. The individuals were relieved 
from a great deal of their moral burdens in 
specific situations, whereas the market sys-
 
Figure 1. Comparison of possible future states in terms of the utility or welfare of individuals. The utility of an individual is in each state 
measured on a scale between 1 and 10, depending on the intensity, duration and certainty of the expected pleasures and pains. No-
tice that State I must be selected, even though this is the worst possible situation for C. Bentham did assume a law of diminishing 
marginal utility to be effective, though, wherefore increasing equality was likely to lead to an enlargement of  total utility. 
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 tem as a whole needed moral justification. It 
was still essential that a moral spectator 
could find the overall results of the market 
processes satisfying.  
 
Smith’s arguments were not only that in-
creased productivity, a result of the division of 
labour induced by competition, made the 
population more prosperous. He also found 
that the market encouraged people to de-
velop a series of virtues essential for the 
good life, including autonomy, self-command 
and self-reliance, prudence, accuracy, dili-
gence, frugality, innovation and industry, 
which the market promotes to such a degree 
that this outmatched its encouragement of 
vices like, first and foremost, vanity, greed, 
and unbounded selfishness (Smith 1790/-
1976) as well as the one-sided development 
of the workers suffering from a harsh division 
of labour. 
 
Smith argued at least partly in terms of vir-
tues. Most of his adherents –  later known as 
neoclassical economists – were utilitarians, 
however, and argued primarily in terms of util-
ity and pleasure (or “units of pleasure-time-
intensity” to use Edgeworth’s phrase) as sub-
stitutes for the Aristotelian ‘happiness.’ For 
them, the basic problem was how to compare 
individual impressions of pleasure and pain 
across persons – and even across time: How 
is utilitarian calculation possible at all, when 
we cannot look into other people’s minds in 
order to measure the intensity of their feel-
ings?  
 
Economic calculation seemed the right an-
swer to this problem. For William Stanley Jev-
ons, for instance, economy was nothing but 
an indirect “Calculus of Pleasure and Pain” 
based on “the mechanics of human inter-
est” (Jevons 1871, vii and 24; Jevons 1988, 
III.1). Its object was explicitly to maximise 
happiness by purchasing pleasure at the low-
est cost of pain (Jevons 1871, 27). The fun-
damental concept of value could accordingly 
only be based on utility in relation to pleasure. 
Because there are no units of enjoyment and 
sorrow, economic science has to do with 
what is second best: measuring the conse-
quences as they are reported in the “private 
account books, the great ledgers of mer-
chants and bankers and public offices, the 
share lists, price lists, bank returns, monetary 
intelligence, Custom-house and other Gov-
ernmental returns” (Jevons 1871, 13).  
 
This move actually brought Jevons away from 
the concept of utility found in hedonistic utili-
tarianism – where there was still room for dis-
cussions about objective usefulness and de-
sirability – to the purely subjective concept of 
preference satisfaction, according to which 
people’s preferences are simply revealed 
through their actual choices as consumers. 
Not only is the mind of an individual the final 
judge of his own quantities of feeling (Jevons 
1871, 19); from the economist’s point of view 
it must also be considered as the sole crite-
rion in matters of what is in the individual’s 
best interest (Jevons 1888, III.3). “Anything 
which an individual is found to desire and to 
labour for must be assumed to possess for 
him utility” (Jevons 1888, III.2). 
 
Consequently, no matter what a person may 
happen to do, it is per definition in his or her 
interest. He or she can, as a matter of princi-
ple, never be wrong (although, perhaps, in-
consistent, unless one assumes that in these 
cases the person’s identity or “preference or-
dering” has simply changed). The value of a 
thing is thus determined not by its objective 
usefulness to individuals or to society at large 
but by its relative scarcity as perceived by the 
individual consumer, i.e., the thing is only 
valuable if the demand for it exceeds supply 
in a specific situation (cf. also Dupuit 1844/-
1952, 89f). Hedonistic utilitarianism was thus 
replaced by preference utilitarianism. ‘Pain’ 
and ‘pleasure’ were replaced as basic con-
 Research Report 4 2006 
 cepts by ‘preference satisfaction’ and 
‘preference frustration.’ 
 
The Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto focused 
on this difference in his Manual of Political 
Economy. In classical political economy most 
writers made use of the simple idea that if a 
thing satisfies the needs or desires of man, it 
has value in use or utility. This notion is im-
perfect and ambiguous on several points, 
however. Firstly, it was not sufficiently noticed 
that this value in use depended on the quanti-
ties consumed: “To be precise, it is necessary 
to speak of the value in use of a certain quan-
tity … added to a known quantity already con-
sumed. It was principally through the correc-
tion of this error on earlier economics that 
pure economics arose” (Pareto, 1927/1971, 
110; cf. also Dupuit 1844/1952, 90f, 101) In-
stead of utility in general, the interesting thing 
for an economist is the marginal utility, or 
rather: the price people are willing to pay at 
the point of equilibrium, where “desires” and 
“obstacles” balances, so that just a slight 
change of price would make them turn down 
an offered good. 
 
Secondly, it was not made clear enough by 
most economists, that in economics the word 
utility has a quite different meaning from that 
of ordinary language and of ethics in general. 
The economists’ utility was only a pragmatic 
proxy for happiness. The drug addict’s mor-
phine, for instance, is not useful in the ordi-
nary sense of the word, since it is harmful to 
him; whereas “it is economically useful to 
him, even though it is unhealthful, because it 
satisfies one of his wants.” Instead of talking 
about economic utility, as if it was compara-
ble to the concept of utility in ordinary lan-
guage, Pareto therefore suggested the word 
ophelimity (Pareto, 1927/1971, 111).  
 
His famous criterion of the economic optimal-
ity (later known as the Pareto-optimum), 
which became the fundamental criterion in 
cost-benefit analysis, was therefore also for-
mulated in terms of ophelimity: “We will say 
that the members of a collectivity enjoy maxi-
mum ophelimity in a certain position when it 
is impossible to find a way of moving from 
that position very slightly in such a manner 
that the ophelimity enjoyed by each of the in-
dividuals of that collectivity increases or de-
creases.  
 
That is to say, any small displacement in de-
parting from that position necessarily has the 
effect of increasing the ophelimity which cer-
tain individuals enjoy, and decreasing that 
which others enjoy, of being agreeable to 
some and disagreeable to others” (Pareto, 
1927/1991, 261). This is the state of equilib-
rium which an ideal market can be expected 
to tend towards. The market automatically 
finds local equilibria, and when it is complex 
enough, it will tend towards an overall equilib-
rium, which maximizes the marginal utility or 
ophelimity of all. 
 
The fact that a commodity, a project, or a pol-
icy is economically useful is not enough in it-
self to recommend it, however. This is only 
the case within a pure economic science. 
When applied in real life situations the stan-
dards of the homo economicus has to be sup-
plied with others from the vocabulary of the 
homo ethicus and maybe even some of those 
of the homo religious (even though Pareto 
himself was rather sceptical about whether 
there was much rationality to be found here). 
In real life, the preference utilitarianism of 
economic science was not enough. The stan-
dards of pure economics could not be used 
without supplementary considerations. 
 
Alfred Marshall made a similar point in his 
Principles of Economics. From a purely eco-
nomical point of view all incentives to action 
must be treated as primâ facie equal, and the 
economist “does not attempt to weigh the real 
value of the higher affections of our nature 
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 against those of our lower” (Marshall 1920/-
1947, 16). When he speaks of ‘utility,’ he im-
plicitly think of it as the correlative to ‘desire’ 
or ‘want,’ but this is to some extend mislead-
ing, because “desires cannot be measured di-
rectly, but only indirectly by the outward phe-
nomena to which they give rise.” The only 
measure he is allowed to use is the price 
which a person is willing to pay for the fulfil-
ment or satisfaction of his desire, and it can 
only be assumed implicitly, that “the resulting 
satisfaction corresponds in general fairly well 
to that which was anticipated when the pur-
chase was made” (Marshall 1920/1946, 92).  
 
One has to admit, however, that many wishes 
are, for instance, too impulsive or result from 
habit. Some can even be labelled as perverse 
or morbid. Others are based on futile expec-
tations that are never fulfilled. If one could ac-
tually measure both the revealed preferences 
and the actual satisfaction or happiness, the 
two curves would undoubtedly be quite differ-
ent (Marshall 1920/1946, 92f).  
 
Still, because real satisfaction and happiness 
– and together with this: real utility – cannot 
be measured directly, economists have 
agreed to content themselves with the re-
vealed preferences only, making a kind of 
trade off between, on the one hand, the loss 
of accuracy and sensitivity and, on the other 
hand, the larger opportunities for exact meth-
ods. Moreover, by using broad averages in 
order to counterbalance one another the per-
sonal peculiarities of individuals, the average 
willingness to pay to obtain a benefit or avoid 
an injury may after all be a reliable measure 
of the average benefit or injury (Marshall 
1920/1946, 18; cf. also Jevons 1871, 22f).  
 
The crux of the matter is that regardless of 
what people may happen to choose, it is now 
– within economic science – per definition 
considered to be in their interest, because 
their interests are defined by their mutually 
separable preferences, which are revealed, 
and can thus be measured, through their 
market behaviour. The welfare of two persons 
can easily be compared, then, because the 
values of both A’s and B’ satisfaction of pref-
erences are both commensurable and directly 
measurable by their willingness to pay for it.  
 
The basic assumptions in 
welfare economics 
 
The status of the specific economic concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘utility’ and the relation to their 
extra-economic counterparts in ordinary life 
has given rise to a number of recurring dilem-
mas in economics. Is economics a science, a 
political ideology, an art, or a social engineer-
ing methodology? Is it a descriptive or norma-
tive discipline? Can it make recommenda-
tions on its own or can it not? Is it an empiri-
cal science or a speculative construction 
based on a series of rather implausible as-
sumptions? Is there is a high degree of corre-
lation between economics and ordinary life, 
as Marshall suggested, or is the modest atti-
tude of Pareto more appropriate?  
 
Most economists do not consider economics 
primarily to be a pure science. In the words of 
Pigou: “Its purpose its rather practical and 
utilitarian, concerned chiefly to lay bare such 
parts of knowledge as to serve, directly or in-
directly, to help forward the betterment of so-
cial life” (Pigou 1912/1999, 4; cf. also Sam-
uelson 1948, 5 and 15). The bridge between 
economic science and total welfare should 
not “rust unused” (Pigou 1912/1999, 13).  
 
At the same time, however, many economists 
tend to see their discipline as some sort of 
value-free enterprise. Economists who see 
themselves as making ‘descriptive’ or 
‘predictive’ research, trying to leave it to oth-
ers to supply evaluative standards, are there-
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 fore more common than those who explicitly 
see themselves as welfare economists (Sen 
1987, chp. 2) – although both parties primar-
ily rely on Pareto optimality as evaluative cri-
terion. Still, no economic theory can avoid 
normative assumptions and statements. To 
use economic efficiency as a goal is in itself a 
normative decision. As I.M.D. Little has put it: 
“Some feel that economics becomes unscien-
tific if value judgments are admitted: they are 
trying to fly without wings” (Little 2002, 23). 
Consequently, economists have to justify that 
they actually help improving social utility, wel-
fare – or happiness, or the supreme good. I 
shall return to this question in Part II. 
 
Let us assume in the rest of this Part that 
there is enough correlation between econom-
ics and real life to make welfare economic 
science relevant in planning. Before we pro-
ceed, it seems appropriate to sum up the as-
sumptions, which have been presented so 
far, and which continues to be core assump-
tions in modern economic theory, and to add 
a couple more: 
 
• The common good, supreme good or so-
cial utility can be reduced to an aggrega-
tion of the utilities of individuals. Society is 
nothing but the sum of individuals interact-
ing to their mutual advantage. 
• The complete utility related to an individual 
can be reduced to an aggregation of sepa-
rable preference satisfactions, no matter 
how and why these may happen to be at-
tained.  
• Individual preferences are assumed to be 
related only to consequences for the indi-
vidual him- or herself. They do not include 
political preferences for more equality in 
society, for instance, or preferences for 
other people’s flourishing, unless this is re-
flected explicitly in the individuals’ market 
behaviour. Even if the individual can be 
observed to be willing to pay for these 
goods, it is often assumed that what he or 
she is actually paying for is some kind of 
personal satisfaction such as the “warm 
glow” following from virtuous acts or peace 
of mind. 
• The marginal utility of goods is diminishing. 
For each extra unit of a certain good one 
gets, less utility is obtained compared to 
the previous units (unless otherwise 
proven). 
• In general, desires or preferences are re-
vealed through individuals’ behaviour on 
the market, and their intensities (together 
with their expected duration and certainty) 
can be measured by the consumers’ will-
ingness to pay. 
• The market provides a balance or competi-
tive equilibrium, where social utility is maxi-
mized, as long as no market failures occur. 
• Consequently, public interference is only 
appropriate in cases of market failure 
• In these cases the aggregated costs and 
benefits of possible interferences should 
be measured through calculations based 
on shadow pricing, where ideal market 
processes are imitated as far as possible.  
• Prospective projects and policies with 
should be ranked in accordance with their 
benefit-cost ratio, and the one with the 
highest score should be implemented first. 
Implementation of the remaining projects 
and policies should be continued until the 
public budget is used up, or the one com-
bination of projects and policies should be 
chosen which maximizes net benefits 
within the budgetary limits. 
 
It is thus a basic assumption that, due to the 
efficiency of the market, it is only in cases of 
market failure that public interference is 
needed for adjustment. This is done through 
the construction of theoretical markets, which 
as far as possible reflect the observed normal 
market behaviour of individuals. This is where 
cost-benefit calculations become relevant.  
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 Cost-benefit analysis 
- a short history of the 
tool 
 
Although the first study which could be called 
a cost-benefit analysis was carried out by the 
French Abbé de Saint Pierre, who studied the 
utility of public road improvements in details 
as early as in 1708, a more systematic treat-
ment did not emerge until a group of French 
engineers at the École Nationale des Ponts et 
Chaussées made an effort to develop me-
thodical procedures in the spirit of Adam 
Smith and his French adherent Jean-Baptiste 
Say in the first half of the 19th century 
(Ekelund & Hébert 1999). These engineers 
saw the purpose of public works explicitly as 
one of redressing market failures, wherefore 
their utility needed to be analysed in market 
terms.  
 
The culmination of this theoretical effort was 
a series of influential articles written by the 
French engineers Auguste Cournot and Jules 
Dupuit in mid 19th century. In these articles 
they developed a number of points which are 
often associated with the so-called founding 
fathers of micro-economics, who wrote their 
most influential books in the second half of 
the 19th century. Dupuit, in particular, is rec-
ognized as the inventor of the so-called mar-
ginal utility analysis, where the value of a pro-
ject is measured by the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for marginal benefits in a situa-
tion which is assumed to be close to a com-
petitive equilibrium (Dupuit 1844/1952).  
 
Despite the efforts of the French engineers 
and a few other early attempts cost-benefit 
analysis in the spirit of neoclassical econom-
ics was not systematically applied until, in 
1936, the U.S. Flood Control Act required that 
the expected benefits from planned flood-
control projects should exceed their pre-
sumed costs (Campen 1986; Hufsmith 2000). 
This act was part of the New Deal anti-
depression program of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
focusing on the creation of new jobs and giv-
ing new stimulation to the economy after the 
great Wall Street collapse. The Flood Control 
Act was the main result of a process where 
new planning instrument were introduced by 
the National Planning Board which was es-
tablished in 1934, and the issue of flood con-
trol – or, more generally, management of wa-
ter resources, including flood control, water 
supply, irrigation, navigation, hydropower, 
and later on: water-related outdoor recreation 
and water quality – became the spearhead of 
the introduction of cost-benefit analysis as 
part of public administration in the U.S. 
 
In the following years various committees re-
lated to the public management of water re-
source continued to develop the principles 
and standards used in cost-benefit assess-
ment. The most significant result of this proc-
ess was the publishing of the report Proposed 
Practices for Economic Analysis of River Ba-
sin Projects by the Sub-Committee on Bene-
fits and Costs of the Federal Inter-Agency 
River Basin Committee in 1950. This report, 
which soon became known as the Green 
Book, for a long time set the standard for the 
construction of cost-benefit analysis in rela-
tion to public investments (Hufsmith 2000, 
Caulfield 2000, Kneese 2000, Pearce 1998).  
 
It explicitly used some of the controversial 
principles developed in neoclassical welfare 
economics, particularly in relation to the ac-
counting of secondary costs and benefits on 
a national scale (“to whomsoever they may 
accrue”) and to discounting future costs and 
benefits based on opportunity costs of capital 
rates, i.e. the rates which could be obtained 
from the most beneficial alternative invest-
ments. 
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 It also triggered a heavy activity in developing 
cost-benefit analysis in various research insti-
tutions, of which the Harvard Water Program 
was the most influential. The Green Book 
was never fully adopted by the Federal Com-
mittee, however, due to disagreements over 
which secondary costs to include. 
 
The basic principles and procedures recom-
mended in the Green Book were adopted by 
the U.S. Bureau of the Budget in their Budget 
Circular A-47 from 1952. This Circular was 
used by the Bureau on all water related pro-
jects during the 1950’s, the peak period of 
dam building, although with a strong empha-
sis on primary regional benefits.  
 
Since then cost-benefit analysis has been a 
recurring feature in U.S public regulation, and 
from the early 1960’s – when the Circular A-
47 was replaced by the broader Senate 
Document 97 (Caulfield 2000) – it was 
adopted in other public investment programs, 
and along with the growth of government 
spending during the 1960’s it was applied in 
new areas like transportation, health, and 
safety regulations (Campen 1986, 20). In 
general, however, the programs were still de-
signed from a multiple purpose approach, 
where objectives like expenditure constraints, 
equitable income distribution, regional devel-
opment, human health effects, and, only mar-
ginally, preservation of environmental quality 
were assessed along with that of economic 
efficiency. The programs did not try to meas-
ure these impacts in monetary terms, but 
considered them as ‘incommensurables.’ 
 
This problem, particularly in relation to exter-
nalities, became a major issue of research in 
the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which Richard Nixon established in 
1970 (Pearce 1998, U.S. EPA 2003), and 
where various indirect “revealed preference” 
techniques were explored, despite the fact 
that cost-benefit analysis was prohibited in re-
lation to some of the basic environmental 
laws – the Clean Air, Clean Water, and En-
dangered Species Acts – from the early 
1970’s (Cropper and Oakes 1992, 675; Arrow 
et al. 1996, 4; Nash 1989). At that time cost-
benefit analysis had obtained a rather nasty 
reputation due to a series of studies, which 
mainly served as mere window dressing for 
predetermined positions on some dubious 
water regulation projects. A congressional 
sub-committee went as far as to conclude, in 
1976, that cost-benefit analysis to a large ex-
tent was used as “an effective disguise for 
subjective advocacy” (Campen 1986, 52). 
 
The EPA-research did help cost-benefit 
analysis getting a comeback as a primary tool 
in public regulation, particularly because 
health and environmental issues, hitherto 
largely ignored, were now included in the 
studies. Consumer valuations of externalities 
were inferred from property pricing in areas of 
high environmental quality, transportation 
costs to nature sites, etc.  
 
These techniques were, particularly in the 
1980’s, supplied by “stated preference” tech-
niques like the so-called contingent valuation 
based on Willingness-To-Pay surveys. This 
technique had been suggested as early as in 
1947 by the economist Ciriacy-Wantrup, but it 
was not generally recognized until a couple of 
EPA-conferences in the 1980’s brought it into 
mainstream economics (Hanemann 1994). 
The methods were acknowledged officially in 
the U.S. in the 1980 Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act, which included recognition of rights to 
sue for damages on non-use values. This in-
clusion later on led to a heated debate on ex-
istence value and liability of contingent valua-
tion, particularly after the Exxon Valdez acci-
dent in 1989 (Portney 1994). 
 
The essential idea was to internalize the ex-
ternalities into the cost-benefit planning 
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 method in order to be able to use a coherent 
evaluation scheme without ‘incommen-
surables.’ During the last three decades of 
the 20th century EPA funded more than 450 
studies focusing on methods for economic 
analysis, particularly on measuring environ-
mental costs and benefits (U.S. EPA 2004). 
 
Cost-benefit analysis was officially recog-
nized as a basic tool in U.S. federal planning 
when, in February 1981, president Reagan 
signed the Executive Order 12291, which re-
quires that federal regulatory agencies use 
cost-benefit analysis (as the basic part of the 
so-called Regulatory Impact Analysis, RIA) 
on proposed regulations which are estimated 
to cost more than $100 million.  
 
This was not all too radical a change, how-
ever, as previous presidents had already en-
couraged economic efficiency assessment of 
public investments, and although ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’ was not explicitly mentioned in 
Jimmy Carter’s Executive Order 12044 from 
1978 or in President Ford’s Executive Order 
11281 from 1974, the weighting of economic 
gains and losses were nevertheless strongly 
recommended as part of what Ford called In-
flationary Impact Assessment (later renamed 
to Economic Impact Statement) and Carter 
called Regulatory Analysis (RA) (Campen 
1986, 20; U.S. EPA 2003). So it was in Bill 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 on Regula-
tory Planning and Review from 1993 recom-
mending Economic Assessments (EA), which 
through the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) still sets the standard for eco-
nomic evaluations of public initiatives. 
 
In the period following Reagan’s Executive 
Order the focus was turned from public pro-
ject investments to policies and regulatory ac-
tions, and the implicit aim was to prevent 
“over-regulation” (Pearce 1998, 87; Campen 
1986, 54f). ‘De-regulation´ and ‘efficiency in 
public expenditure’ became the new buzz-
words, not only in the U.S., but in many other 
parts of the world as well. Cost-benefit analy-
sis does not a priori recommend deregulation 
and privatization, however, even though the 
strong commitment to market mechanisms 
obviously pulls in this direction. 
 
Core elements and  
principles in cost-benefit 
analysis 
 
According to the neo-classical paradigm cost-
benefit analysis should only be used in cases 
where public interference becomes relevant 
due to the presence of a market failure. Some 
of the most common cases are: 
 
• When the market cannot provide certain 
goods without public planning and/or inter-
ference. This is primarily the case in rela-
tion to the basic infrastructure: transport 
systems, water supply systems, sewage 
systems, garbage disposal systems, en-
ergy transport systems, research facilities, 
etc., and to their regulatory and institu-
tional setting: energy policy, transport pol-
icy, agricultural policy, cleaner technology 
policy, etc. 
• When public projects may help the market 
getting started again in cases of regres-
sion and unemployment (although not all 
welfare economists would accept interfer-
ences in this case). 
• When the values of some costs or bene-
fits, the so-called externalities, are not reg-
istered on the market. This is first and fore-
most the case with current and future envi-
ronmental and health effects like the con-
sequences of an enhanced greenhouse ef-
fect, loss of biodiversity and nature quality, 
eutrophication, toxic or eco-toxic chemi-
cals, etc. 
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 The essential idea of the method is to com-
pare a scenario, which includes the realiza-
tion of a promising project or policy (or the 
closing of a problematic project/policy), to a 
scenario without this project or policy and/or 
to scenarios with alternative projects or poli-
cies. The basic principle is that the one pro-
ject or policy should be chosen, which leads 
to the scenario which scores best in eco-
nomic terms. Present as well as future cost 
and benefits are estimated through so-called 
shadow pricing, i.e., the consumers’ expected 
willingness-to-pay on the margin, assuming 
that the market is working close to its opti-
mum (within certain unalterable constraints). 
In principle, all those projects or policies 
should be realized, which come out of the 
analysis with a positive score, and therefore 
potentially enhance the welfare of at least 
one individual without declining the welfare of 
others (who can, in principle, be compen-
sated).  
 
Projects and policies with a positive score 
thus pass the so-called potential Pareto-
improvement test in accordance with the so-
called Kaldor/Hicks criterion: a project or pol-
icy is an improvement, if, in principle, the 
gainers could compensate the losers even if 
they do not. It is only a potential improvement 
according to the Pareto criterion referred 
above, because somebody is actually going 
to be worse off without compensation.  
 
It is generally accepted as the basic criterion 
in cost-benefit analysis, though, for pragmatic 
reasons – almost no project would comply 
with the strict Pareto criterion – assuming that 
in the end there will be a balance between 
gainers and losers of different projects and 
policies, or that everybody will gain from gen-
eral economic improvements. 
 
In the following paragraphs the typical steps 
of the analysis are presented. Apart from a 
few minor variations, the overall design of the 
procedure is generally accepted (cf. Campen 
1986, U.S. EPA 1983/1991, OMB 1996, 
Layard & Glaister 1996, Boardman et al. 
1996, Finansministeriet 1999, U.S. EPA 
2000, Møller et al. 2000). What is much more 
controversial, however, is the choice of as-
sumptions and methods used in each of the 
procedural steps as well as the range of im-
pacts to include. I shall return to some of 
these controversial issues in the following 
chapter. 
 
Step 1 
Identify the problem (market failure) and 
seek promising solutions 
 
According to the neoclassical economics 
paradigm, the standard problems which jus-
tify public action are market failures. The 
identification of a market failure and the justi-
fication for public action is therefore the first 
step in cost-benefit analysis. For example, al-
though it seems reasonable to build a bridge 
across a river in order to save time, and many 
truck and car drivers can be expected to be 
willing to pay their tiny part of it, no private 
company may be ready to initiate the con-
struction right away due to the high construc-
tion costs, the risks involved, existing public 
plans and regulations, etc. So the market 
cannot solve the problem without a certain 
amount of public involvement.  
 
The next step is to find the most promising 
projects (or changes in public regulations) 
which could solve the problem at hand. In the 
case mentioned, building a bridge may seem 
the most obvious solution, but there may also 
be other ways to solve the truck and car driv-
ers’ inconveniences. More ferries, for exam-
ple. The selected solutions can then be var-
ied in many ways: time and scale, renting or 
purchasing, changing location, varying quality 
targets, etc. (cf. also U.K. Treasury 2000, 18). 
These are only the most obvious answers, 
however.   
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 More comprehensive kinds of planning poli-
cies – relocation of the local industries, for in-
stance – may also help to solve the problem. 
In general, however, due to the neoclassical 
paradigm, these more comprehensive solu-
tions are seldom tried, because they interfere 
more with the market mechanism, which is 
accepted as the most appropriate means to 
improve public welfare. The general assump-
tion has typically been that piecemeal engi-
neering, to use the Austrian philosopher Karl 
Popper’s expression (Popper 1974), is al-
ways preferable to comprehensive planning. 
 
With the move from project investment to pol-
icy and regulatory action as the main field for 
cost-benefit analysis, this has changed to 
some extent. Policies are always more com-
prehensive than projects. There are also usu-
ally more alternatives to choose amongst: im-
proved information, control and command, 
performance-based standards, taxes, fees, 
charges, subsidies, marketable emission per-
mit systems, deposit-refund systems, volun-
tary agreements, etc. The selection of alter-
natives depends not only on the nature of the 
issue at hand, but also on tradition, political 
signals, approach fashion, etc. 
 
In many cases a solution has already been 
proposed by the public authorities, and cost-
benefit analysis is then applied in order to de-
termine whether the proposed policy or pro-
ject is as worthwhile as it seems to the au-
thorities proposing it. Consequently, the 
analysis only covers a fairly narrow range of 
projects and policies, in most cases only the 
proposed project or policy in various designs.  
 
In theory, the proposed project’s benefits 
should be compared with those of all other 
possible projects, even in other policy areas 
(health policy, for instance), in order to find 
the most beneficial ones. In practice, this is 
never done (Boardman et al. 1996, 13). In 
any case, there is inevitably a balance to be 
observed between thoroughness of analysis 
and limits of practicality (OMB 1996, 4 and 7).  
 
It is worth remembering that cost-benefit 
analyses are extremely costly. A ten year old 
study showed that the US Environment Pro-
tection Agency on average spent $700.000 
(1996 prices) on each analysis of proposed 
regulations which fulfilled the criteria in 
Reagan’s Executive Order (Boardman et al. 
1996, 12). 
 
Step 2 
Define and delimit the  
impact analysis 
 
Next step is to define and delimit the analysis. 
There are three important questions to an-
swer in advance. The first question is how 
many aspects of the project, the life cycle of a 
bridge, for instance, should be included. The 
standard answer is that all significant impacts 
should be taken into account, but significance 
is seldom a quality which is easy to agree 
upon. It is not altogether obvious which im-
pacts to include. 
 
We are faced with questions like how far 
away in time and space impacts should be 
taken into account. Building a bridge will have 
consequences in many links, where the pre-
cise causal relationships are often difficult to 
specify. The well-known example of an Ama-
zon butterfly causing a storm in China when 
circumstances are right illustrates the difficul-
ties involved in specifying the causal chains 
in an environment evolving in nonlinear proc-
esses. Conclusions are necessarily prelimi-
nary, uncertain, and very often based on con-
troversial scientific knowledge. It has to be 
decided, too, which geographic as well as 
time scales to use. In practise, due to limited 
amounts of time and resources, only a rather 
narrowly defined part of the consequences is 
typically described. If, in accordance with the 
piecemeal engineering approach, the project 
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 or policy is considered as a marginal change 
– as is most often the case – this will support 
the use of a narrow definition, too. 
 
Secondly, before describing the impacts it is 
necessary to identify a baseline scenario 
against which the proposed policy or project 
should be evaluated. The specification of 
baseline conditions has significant influence 
on the final result. One possibility is simply to 
use status quo as baseline. Another is to pick 
the most likely scenario, if the policy or pro-
ject is not carried through, based on relevant 
trends. In the proposed bridge case, it can be 
estimated how traffic is likely to change over 
time, how the general economic state of af-
fairs can be expected to alter, etc.  
 
This kind of baseline scenario building is of-
ten burdened with huge uncertainties. Sev-
eral highly unpredictable factors are often of 
crucial importance in long term scenarios. Let 
me just mention a couple of examples. Firstly, 
assumptions about technological innovation 
with and without a proposed project or policy 
are difficult to handle due to the very nature 
of innovation. What makes it even more diffi-
cult to deal with is the fact that technological 
innovation is not exogenous to the implemen-
tation of the proposed project or policy but of-
ten to a large extent dependent on this 
(Löschel 2002). Secondly, assumptions about 
long time future demand cannot be anything 
but shaky; this is particularly true for goods 
like scarce environmental resources.  
 
In the OMB and EPA Guidelines it is empha-
sized that the specification of baseline condi-
tions is demanding on the “honesty and integ-
rity” of the analyst, wherefore all assumption 
should be clearly both identified and justified. 
The presence of components with great un-
certainty and significant effect on the final re-
sults calls for the inclusion of more than one 
baseline in the analysis (U.S. EPA 2000, 21f; 
U.S. OMB, 9). 
The third important question to answer is 
whether a local, national or global approach 
is most appropriate. This is a question of 
whose interests are recognized to have 
standing: only those of local people, the na-
tional or global human interests, or the inter-
ests of all including those of other species. 
One possible answer in cost-benefit analysis 
is that willingness to pay is the key to getting 
one’s interest into the account. This would not 
only exclude the interests of other species 
than humans, but also effects which are not 
recognized by the potential victims (a market 
failure in itself).  
 
Another answer is that it is only necessary to 
include impacts on members of the political 
community which pays for the project. If the 
analysis is sponsored by a nation state, for in-
stance, improvements of the trade balance of 
the country is counted on the positive side, 
even if this result in larger problems in other 
countries. Similarly, if only the net benefits of 
the paying local community is included, the 
costs of a project falling on neighbouring 
communities within the same country become 
irrelevant, unless these losses are covered 
through national taxation.  
 
It is basically an ethical question to decide 
whose interests are recognized to have 
standing. The answer is not determined sim-
ply by the range of effects, but depends just 
as much on the understanding of the close-
ness of the relationships (human as well as 
inter-special) between the individuals affected 
by the impacts. To leave the decision to be 
determined by actual market behaviour indi-
cators is one possibility, of course. It is not a 
neutral one, however, but based on the rather 
precarious assumption that the market consti-
tutes the best decision procedure on ethical 
matters due to people’s general lack of mu-
tual interest. 
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 Step 3 
Describe the impact 
 
The probable changes caused by the project 
or policy in question are described and meas-
ured in relevant units. In standard cost-benefit 
analyses it is paramount that all impacts are 
quantified either directly or by the use of indi-
cators. Whenever possible, impacts should 
be described in ways which turn them into po-
tentially marketable goods. Otherwise it is 
more difficult later on to attach precise eco-
nomic values to them. 
 
In order for impacts to be counted in the cost-
benefit analysis, they need to have an impact 
on the preferences of human beings. Econo-
mists typically distinguish between different 
kinds of preferences. Some preferences are 
related to the direct or indirect use value of a 
good. Others are related to option value, i.e., 
the value of being able later on to use the 
good. This value is often determined as the 
expected future opportunities multiplied by 
some probability factor.  
 
Some economists estimate preferences re-
lated to so-called bequest value, i.e., the 
value (as experienced by current people) of 
leaving future generations, say, an area in 
good shape. This bequest value should not 
be mixed up with the actual value of a good 
(economically or otherwise) for future people. 
Finally, some preferences are related to exis-
tence value, i.e., the value (as experienced 
by current or future people) that something 
continues to exist even though it may have no 
present or future use value. Again, existence 
value should not be mixed up with intrinsic 
value (or inherent worth), i.e. the value or 
worth of entities which have their own good, 
independently of the value attached to them 
by human beings. 
 
The inclusion of risk, i.e., the distribution of 
the probability of being hurt or injured by a 
project or policy, and uncertainty, i.e., the lack 
of precise knowledge about these (and other) 
probabilities, is a separate issue. In most 
cases it is necessary to use average numbers 
as well as statistical probability estimates in 
relation to some of the costs and/or benefits 
of a project or policy. This is often a difficult 
task, because different scientists may have 
dissimilar opinions on the issue at hand, or 
clear evidence is lacking. Full disclosure and 
transparency is therefore important, and as-
sessments of a number of plausible alterna-
tive scenarios, or a sensitivity test reflecting 
the differing interpretations of experts, are of-
ten highly needed. Delphi methods or con-
sensus meetings involving groups of dis-
agreeing scientists have also been used.  
 
Here, again, there is balance to be observed 
between thoroughness of analysis and limits 
of practicality. In accordance with cost-benefit 
analysis’ focus on current consumer prefer-
ences, the actual consumers’ risk valuations 
should be of particular interest, but these are 
seldom included. Sometimes a risk premium 
for particularly risk-averse individuals is con-
sidered, though (U.S. OMB, 18). 
 
Step 4 
Attach economic values to the various 
kinds of impacts 
 
In order to be able to compare the various 
kinds of costs and benefits directly, these 
should all as far as possible be monetised, 
i.e., economic values should be attached to 
all impacts of the selected alternatives. In 
most cases, it is essential that all goods are 
measured with a precise value, and not just 
as more or less compared with other goods 
on a common scale. Some values can be 
measured directly on the market: labour 
costs, building materials, land, equipment, of-
fice facilities, etc. – assuming, contrafactually, 
a) that the market works in accordance with 
the theoretical ideal, and b) that, in general, 
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 the measured impacts continues to have the 
same relative value.  
 
Whenever there are obvious obstacles to this, 
like, for instance, the presence of monopo-
lies, this should, in principle, be adjusted for 
in the analysis, but this is rarely done, and all 
the small market failures are simply ignored. 
Another problem, which is largely ignored, is 
the changing relative values of goods. This is 
particularly problematic in cases where long 
term impacts are assessed, and even more 
so when future people’s preferences – and 
the resulting market terns - need to be in-
cluded. 
 
Cost and benefits are considered as opportu-
nity costs, i.e., the economic value of benefits 
forgone or gained when a public project or 
policy is carried through, including costs of 
compliance, administrative costs, transaction 
costs, and time losses. In cost-benefit analy-
sis, public project should, in principle, always 
be measured against the best potential alter-
native, the benefits of which thus become the 
costs of the project (Layard & Glaister 1996, 
1). The most straightforward way to measure 
these costs is to conceive of them as lost or 
gained consumer goods and – assuming the 
market to reflect the potential benefits of al-
ternative applications – let opportunity costs 
equal the marginal costs as reflected in pre-
sent prices on the materials, labour, property, 
etc. needed for a proposed project together 
with the losses and gains of consumer oppor-
tunities experienced by individuals directly or 
indirectly affected by the project.  
 
Sometimes it is not as simple as this, though. 
For instance, if the market prices in an area 
can be expected to change significantly due 
to the implementation of the proposed pro-
ject, i.e., when supply is inelastic to some ex-
tent, this will influence opportunity costs. If 
the market price of a good becomes lower 
than a consumer would actually be willing to 
pay for it, measured by current market prices, 
there is, in accordance with neoclassical the-
ory, a consumer surplus.  
 
Likewise, if the market price becomes higher 
than a producer would actually be willing to 
produce and sell a product for, there is a pro-
ducer surplus. If a public project or policy 
changes the prices on certain goods, the 
positive or negative changes in consumer 
and producer surpluses are considered in the 
cost-benefit analysis. Lost or gained sur-
pluses are accounted as positive or negative 
opportunity costs (the negative ones are 
sometimes referred to as deadweight loss), 
assuming that they would have been used or 
are going to be used or invested somewhere 
else. 
 
Another way to measure the opportunity 
costs of a public project is to measure the lost 
or gained investment opportunities in general. 
In this case it is not the opportunity costs of 
the specific materials, labour, etc. but of lost 
or gained capital in a more generalized 
sense. These costs, the so-called opportunity 
costs of capital include the not achieved re-
turns from potential investments, typically 
measured on the basis of market rates of re-
turn.  
 
There is no clear and commonly accepted 
rule telling when opportunity costs are meas-
ured as either lost consumer goods or lost in-
vestment opportunities. They are only directly 
substitutable, however, if one assumes a con-
sumer’s rate of time preference for consump-
tion equal to the marginal rate of return of 
capital. Most cost benefit analyses treat op-
portunity costs as consumer costs and dis-
count afterwards with a discount rate equal to 
the rate of return of investments (Arrow et al. 
1996, 130). 
 
Externalities are – positive or negative – in-
cremental impacts which are not valued di-
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 rectly on the market. Examples of these are 
losses or savings of human lives, injuries and 
inconveniences, time losses or savings, in-
creases or reductions of risks, losses of 
populations of certain species, impacts on na-
ture quality, scenic views, losses or improve-
ments of ecological services, inconveniences 
for other species, etc. In all these cases eco-
nomic values are attached otherwise through 
various kinds of shadow pricing, assuming 
contrafactually the presence of an ideal mar-
ket for non-priced goods. 
 
This kind of shadow pricing can be done in a 
number of ways (cf., for instance, Cropper & 
Oates 1992; Pearce & Moran 1994, chp. 5; 
Pearce 1993, Appendix II; Hanemann 1994; 
Boardman et al. 1996, chps. 10-12; U.S. EPA 
2000, chp. 7). The general principle is that 
the measurement should be made in a way 
which imitates the market mechanism as far 
as possible. For instance, non-prized goods 
like endangered species could be measured 
through so-called contingent valuation based 
on willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept 
surveys, where a representative group of citi-
zens are asked, how much they would be 
willing to pay for saving the species, or how 
much compensation they would demand if 
the species eventually is lost. This is the 
stated preference approach, where individu-
als respond to hypothetical questions. 
 
Some cost-benefit analysts consider this to 
be a rather unreliable way to make evalua-
tions, though, and they prefer to use indica-
tors based on actual market behaviour. This 
is the revealed preference approach. An ex-
ample of this is the so-called hedonic pricing, 
where certain amenity values – peace and 
quiet, environmental quality, closeness to the 
sea, significant views, etc. – are reflected in 
property value. Other examples are valuation 
of time savings for various kinds of drivers 
based on their income related to the time 
saved, valuation of nature sites indicated 
from the travel costs people are willing to pay 
to reach the sites, or occupational-risk premi-
ums in wages, indicating individuals’ price for 
their willingness to accept incremental risks.  
 
Still another approach is to measure the ex-
pected costs of establishing alternatives to a 
lost good, the costs of cleaning an area after 
use, or the costs of re-establishing a lost 
good. This approach implicitly assumes that 
society (now or in the future) is willing to pay 
for the restoration.The selection of methods 
depends not only on the matter at hand, but 
also on the chosen scheme for weighting the 
various interests. One basic dilemma is 
whether all interests should be taken into ac-
count on an equal basis, independently of 
ability to pay, or expected willingness to pay 
is a more proper measure. Most cost-benefit 
analysts tend to prefer the last solution, be-
cause it deviates less from what happens on 
real markets. 
 
Step 5 
Discount for time to find present values 
 
Any public project or policy – building a 
bridge, for instance – has impacts for several 
generations. Actually, and this is a theme well 
known from science fiction literature dealing 
with time machines, any project will have irre-
versible consequences with long chains of 
impacts. In mainstream cost-benefit analysis 
it is assumed that future costs and benefits 
should not count as much as current ones. 
They should be discounted or transformed to 
the so-called net present value by a discount 
factor 1/(1+r)t where r is the discount rate and 
t is a time index (counting years from project 
start). In order to do this it is necessary to set 
up a time scheme which shows when the 
various impacts are going to appear.  
 
The main reasons given for discounting are 
that a) people are in general assumed to pre-
fer to have current needs and wants satisfied 
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 rather than those they may have in the future, 
or b) technological improvement and eco-
nomic growth in society is assumed to make 
people richer in the future, c) people are ex-
pected to care less and less about future peo-
ple the further away they are, because we 
know less and less about who they are and 
what they cherish, or d) future costs and 
benefits are more uncertain, because unfore-
seeable events may change the whole 
scheme. I shall return to discuss the validity 
of these arguments in Part II.  
 
The choice of discount rate is extremely im-
portant in most assessments. In mainstream 
cost-benefit analysis it is often assumed that 
public investments displace private invest-
ments. Public investments should therefore 
do better in terms of interests than private in-
vestments; otherwise they should never be 
implemented. The right discount rate is ac-
cordingly believed to be the interest rate of 
the best or at least the average private invest-
ments, the so-called private rate of return of 
investment, reflected in the market rate of re-
turn, for instance, of long term relatively risk-
free bonds or of the average investments 
(both adjusted for inflation).  
 
This way one gets an estimate of the opportu-
nity cost of capital, i.e., the before-tax rate of 
return to incremental private investments or, 
in other words, the missed opportunities for 
profiting from alternative investments. In this 
case the discount rate will typically be some-
where between 6 and 12 percent per year. It 
is a problem for cost benefit analysis, though, 
that there are several different market rates 
working at the same time due, for instance, to 
differences in risks (as perceived by the 
agents) in different areas.  
 
It is necessary to distinguish between mar-
ginal, short-term projects and comprehensive 
long-term policies. In relation to long-term 
projects and policies which cannot be consid-
ered to be marginal, one could easily end up 
in a contradiction, if a high market rate of re-
turn is used, because this would inevitably in-
fluence the general increase in per capita in-
come or rate of growth of consumption – with 
a corresponding decrease in the marginal util-
ity of net benefits – both of which are usually 
assumed to be lower than the market rate, 
typically some 1 to 3 percent per year, al-
though higher in periods of rapid growth and 
lower in periods of recession. It should be no-
ticed that this rate varies from country to 
country and from time to time so that, in prin-
ciple, different rates ought to be used. In 
practice, the same rate is generally used on 
all impacts.  
 
Step 6 
Add up costs and benefits 
 
If all costs and benefits of alternative solu-
tions are valued with the same denominator, 
the final aggregation is simple. One can sim-
ply pick up all the pieces, collect them, and 
see how profitable the various solutions are. 
Still, the aggregation can be made in a less 
straight-forward way, if it is assumed that one 
monetary unit of costs and benefits is not 
equally valuable to all. An alternative to the 
simple aggregation would be to give asym-
metrical weight to the anticipated costs and 
benefits of different groups. The U.K. Treas-
ury Green Book even demands that any lack 
of explicit adjustment for distributional im-
pacts needs to be justified by the appraising 
agency (U.K. Treasury 2000, 25). 
 
A weighted account seems particularly appro-
priate in cases where the potential Pareto-
improvement (or Kaldor/Hicks) criterion is 
used, but individuals living under difficult cir-
cumstances are likely to get hurt. This choice 
would be consistent with various well-known 
ethical principles such as, for instance, the 
classical hedonistic utilitarian law of declining 
marginal utility of money, according to which 
  25 
 maximization of happiness (or of real utility in-
stead of Pareto’s ophelimity) demands equi-
table distribution of wealth, as well as with 
John Rawls’ difference principle (or maximin 
principle), according to which “the higher ex-
pectations of those better situated are just if 
and only if they work as part of a scheme 
which improves the expectations of the least 
advantaged members of society” (Rawls 
1973, 75). Following the first of these princi-
ples, one could, for instance, weight net 
benefits of various groups of people inversely 
proportional to wealth or income. Following 
the second principle, one could, similarly, in-
crease the weight of net benefits of people 
with possessions or income below a certain 
threshold. 
 
Apart from all the obvious practical difficulties 
of finding a reasonable way of doing this 
(which is one reason why it is seldom tried), a 
disproportionately weighted aggregation en-
tails what many economists would see as the 
disadvantage of diverging the assumptions 
away from those working on the real market. 
For this reason mainstream economists avoid 
it: the two goals of maximizing wealth 
(“efficiency”) and of making the social distri-
bution equitable (“equality”) should be kept 
separate, and not be mixed up in the analy-
sis. At least, they argue, weighted cost-
benefit analysis should never be made with-
out a standard analysis to compare with.  
 
Behind this recommendation lurks the gen-
eral assumption, inherited from Adam Smith, 
that the market works best without interfer-
ence, and that unfortunate outcomes is ad-
justed in due course by the market itself; peo-
ple who lose in one game are likely to win in 
another, if the wealth of society is kept at a 
maximum. It could also be argued, though, 
that cost-benefit analysis is just one out of 
several tools that support decision making 
and that tools works best when they are kept 
as clean as possible. It is up to the decision 
makers, then, to mix the tools in accordance 
with their own standards. 
 
Step 7 
Carry out sensitivity tests 
 
Due to all the controversial and precarious 
elements included in cost-benefit analysis, it 
is necessary to provide sensitivity tests based 
on alternative assumptions in order to see if 
decisions related to any of these elements 
are crucial for the final result.  
 
Whenever this is the case, it is necessary to 
highlight the controversy by presenting con-
clusions of calculations based on alternative 
solutions to controversial issues. The follow-
ing list includes some of the typical controver-
sial and uncertain issues. 
 
• Losses of human lives, injuries and health 
problems. How should the value of statisti-
cal lives and statistical injuries be esti-
mated? Should the statistical lives of vari-
ous groups of people be valued differ-
ently? 
• Can value transfers from other studies be 
used in cases where data are sparse? Are 
the situations comparable, or, if not: how 
can they be made more comparable? 
• Losses of non-human species or popula-
tions and other non-marketed environ-
mental goods. How should we estimate in-
direct use value, option value, existence 
value, and bequest value? Are all kinds of 
values covered by the analysis? 
• Discounting future impacts. Which dis-
count rate(s) should we choose? Should 
all impacts be discounted? At the same 
rate? 
• Dealing with risk and uncertainty. Can 
risks be quantified in more than one way? 
Are expert estimates dissimilar? Are un-
certainties significant?  
• Questions of standing. Whose interests 
should be included? Are some of the non-
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 represented interests significant? 
• The question of baseline. Which variable 
factors and probable changes are in-
cluded? Is there more than one reasonable 
estimate of social and technological devel-
opment? How are future markets going to 
look like, and how can this be accounted 
for in the analysis? 
• The alternative scenarios. Which ones are 
chosen and what is included? 
• The theoretical framework. Do different 
economic theories assume different causal 
relationships? 
• The question of equity. How should the 
distributive impact be dealt with? How 
would different assumptions influence the 
result? 
 
If cost-benefit analysis shall be of any help in 
ethical and political decision making, it ought 
to highlight all controversial assumptions and 
present some thorough reflections on the im-
pact of alternative assumptions. Otherwise 
cost-benefit analysis becomes totally unreli-
able and worthy of the bad reputation it ac-
quired in the seventies (and still has). It is 
true, of course, that there is balance to be ob-
served between thoroughness and practical-
ity, but the sensitivity tests are the worst area 
to place savings, if a cost-benefit analysis 
should be worth the money. 
 
Step 8 
Compare the outcomes and rank them 
 
Projects and policies with potential benefits, 
i.e., where the expected net present value is 
positive, should be ranked in accordance with 
their benefit-cost ratio. The one with the high-
est ratio should be implemented. In principle, 
implementation of all projects and policies 
with positive score should be continued until 
the public budget is used up (or the best mix 
of projects within the budgetary limits should 
be chosen). 
 
In most cases it not as simple as this, how-
ever. Many costs and benefits are difficult to 
monetise in an unambiguous way, and in or-
der to provide a reasonable foundation for po-
litical decision making it is necessary to pre-
sent a number of impacts in a non-monetised 
way. This can be done, for instance, by the 
use of tables, where the importance of vari-
ous hard to monetise impacts is estimated 
on, say, a scale from 1 to 5, and the esti-
mates are defended by arguments. The use 
of procedures like this violates some of the 
basic principles in mainstream cost-benefit 
analysis – the monetisation demand, reliance 
on consumer preferences, etc. – but it makes 
the final outcome more trustworthy as well as 
more useful. The hard to deal with issues are 
not hidden behind controversial methodologi-
cal decisions. 
 
In practice, the ranking of projects and poli-
cies seldom follows the recommendations of 
mainstream cost-benefit analysis, but in-
cludes various other kinds of considerations 
such as distributive effects and matters of eq-
uity, enforcement and compliance problems, 
incentives for innovation, regional develop-
ment, strategic importance, consistency with 
national and international legislation, etc. (cf. 
also U.K. Treasury 2000, 9f). I shall return to 
this at the end of Part II. 
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Cost-benefit analysis includes a large number 
of choices and considerations, many of which 
are controversial or includes a high degree of 
uncertainty. In complex cases there is room 
enough for a whole army of devils to move 
into the details. One of the key principles, 
which ought to be observed by all analysts, is 
therefore full disclosure and transparency in 
order for the conclusions to be tested and as-
sessed by independent observers. Any ana-
lyst striving to live up to the previously cited 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget de-
mand for “honesty and integrity” should high-
light all potentially controversial or uncertain 
assumptions. This is particularly important in 
cases where assumptions are hidden in a 
specific methodology. Similarly, it is ex-
tremely important to present sensitivity tests 
based on alternative assumptions in relation 
to all controversial issues that have vital im-
pact on the outcome of the analysis in order 
to separate robust conclusions from shaky 
ones.  
 
These principles should be observed even 
more carefully when analysts address a gen-
eral public not familiar with cost-benefit analy-
sis. It is quite simply bad practice to present 
conclusions to the public as if they were the 
result of pure and unbiased science without 
mentioning any of the potentially controversial 
assumptions, which almost always have sig-
nificant impact on the conclusions. 
 
In Part II I will focus on some of the issues 
which are most likely to cause controversy, 
and which should therefore be treated with ut-
most care by analysts as well as by readers 
and users of cost-benefit analysis. All prob-
lems are somehow related to the basic idea 
of using the (ideal) market as the basic model 
and seeing economics as a science which is 
value-free apart from one single goal: improv-
ing the efficiency of satisfying private prefer-
ences by chasing Pareto optimums. I shall 
exemplify some of the problems related to the 
extension of market logic and economic cal-
culation beyond the customary limits of the 
market: putting a price on human lives, on 
critical and unique resources, and on future 
costs and benefits. Next I shall discuss prob-
lems related to some of the basic assump-
tions which cost-benefit analysis has inherited 
from neoclassical economy. In the concluding 
section of Part II I will discuss the use of cost-
benefit analysis more generally. 
 
Monetising beyond  
markets  
 
Monetising losses of human lives 
 
It is a basic assumption in cost-benefit analy-
sis that all cost and benefits need to be 
monetised in order to identify the most effi-
cient solution. It is necessary, therefore, to at-
tach economic values even to objects, which 
are not normally traded on the market. One of 
most controversial elements is the monetisa-
tion of human lives (or of potential losses of 
human lives).  
 
Basically, there are two ways to approach this 
issue. On the one hand we have an approach 
in line with Thomas Hobbes’ classical state-
ment that a human being is just one more 
thing, the utility of which can be valuated on 
the market: “The Value, or Worth of a man, is 
as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, 
so much as would be given for the use of his 
Part II: Problems and limitations 
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 Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a 
thing dependent on the need and judgment of 
others” (Hobbes 1651/1968, 152). A person’s 
value is relative to the needs and judgment of 
others, and these are expressed as willing-
ness to pay in acts of exchange.  
 
The market can accordingly provide an objec-
tive measure for the valuation of human lives. 
Hobbes does not distinguish between the 
value (or worth) of a human being in him- or 
herself and the value of the use of his or her 
labour power, and he can therefore quite eas-
ily put a price on human beings. The price of 
a lost human life equals the loss of its labour 
power in the expected remaining working pe-
riod (assuming that nobody else is unem-
ployed, capable, and ready to take over).  
 
Obviously, it will have quite significant conse-
quences, if it is generally accepted that the 
value of human lives depend on the market 
value of their labour power. For instance, the 
loss of an African man with a low salary will 
be much cheaper than the loss of a New York 
stock exchange gambler with a large income. 
The loss of an African woman, whose work is 
not registered on the market, would have no 
influence at all on the account, because she 
has an opportunity cost of zero on the labour 
market. The loss of sick or elderly people, 
who live off their pension and maybe are 
given extensive medical treatment, would 
even be counted as an economic benefit. 
However, even though attempts to get rid of 
these people would be recommendable from 
a narrowly economic point of view – and 
worth considering from that of a utilitarian sat-
isfied with counting pain and pleasure – this 
would be considered a repugnant conclusion 
from any other ethical point of view. 
 
Opposed to the Hobbesian approach we find 
the kind of argument, which has been put for-
ward most forcefully by the German philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant: “Whatever has a price 
can be treated as an equivalent to other 
things; that, however, which is raised beyond 
every price, and therefore cannot be treated 
as an equivalent, has a worth [Würde]” (Kant 
1785/1965). Everything which can be treated 
simply as a means to satisfy human needs or 
wants has a price or exchange value and can 
be traded on the market. This includes hu-
man labour power, which is traded on the la-
bour market. On the other hand, we cannot 
ascribe an exchange value to that which has 
intrinsic value or worth, and according to Kant 
this is the privilege of rational (human) be-
ings. Rational beings should never be treated 
simply as means to satisfy external ends, but 
always also as ends in themselves. 
 
Slavery, the buying and selling of human be-
ings, was abolished long time ago, and no 
one would accept that people were allowed to 
kill each other, if only they paid the market 
value of the lost labour power. Nor do we, in 
ordinary situations, see the death of one par-
ticular, identifiable (and innocent) person as 
an acceptable price to pay in order to obtain a 
certain benefit.  
 
This would be the case, for instance, if a 
medical company or a public hospital picked 
out somebody with the right genes and inflict-
ing him or her involuntarily with a deadly de-
cease in order to test a new drug, which is 
expected to help many others. In general, we 
accept the Kantian argument that human be-
ings (or their flourishing) should never be 
treated as means only, but always also as 
ends in themselves. In this sense they are 
priceless (and not, as some economists, who 
miss the whole point, try to put it in order to 
defeat it: of infinite value).  
 
At the same time, however, we cannot avoid 
making decisions, which shorten some peo-
ple’s lives. For instance, we do not spend the 
major part of our resources in hospitals trying 
to lengthen the lives of dying people, and 
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 even if we did, this would eventually cause 
deaths somewhere else like, say, on disre-
paired roads. Many economists argue that 
potential losses of human lives are likely to 
be forgotten in the process of decision mak-
ing, if we refuse to put a price on them con-
sidered of as statistical lives. Let us assume 
for a moment, then, that it does make sense 
to put a price on (losses of) human lives. 
What exactly are we putting a price on in this 
case? Several suggestions have been put 
forward. Let me concentrate on three main 
candidates. 
 
The first candidate is the loss of potential la-
bour power. This is estimated in the so-called 
human capital approach. In this case we are 
faced with the problem of elderly people with 
a negative price, people who are not related 
to the labour market, etc. Getting rid of these 
people would improve net benefit. A hideous 
conclusion that is, indeed. One way to solve 
this problem could be to use the average in-
come of an individual midway in a life of aver-
age length.  
 
This would raise the problem immediately 
whether we are talking about the average na-
tional or global income and life length. In the 
first case the loss of human lives in poor 
countries would be far cheaper than in rich 
countries, wherefore the riskiest projects 
would be placed in the lands of the poorest 
without their previously stated consent. In the 
second case, the price would be so low that, 
particularly in rich countries, it would pay very 
well not to care about the loss of human lives.  
 
Another way of estimating the potential loss 
of a human life is to estimate the total value 
of production losses due to mortal accidents 
and then divide this total value by the number 
of lost human lives. This method is used, for 
instance, by the Danish Road Directorate, 
and recommended by the Danish Ministry of 
Finance. It leads to a value around €300,000 
per “statistical life” (1999-prices) (Vejdirekto-
ratet 2001; Finansministeriet  1999). 
 
However, an account of the loss of potential 
labour power does not include the losses in-
flicted on the relatives of a dead person. A 
second candidate is therefore the loss of po-
tential labour power plus the pain and sorrow 
inflicted on relatives. In this case, however, 
there are no reliable market based values or 
prices to refer to. The loss of a spouse, a 
mother, a son, or a close friend has no true 
market value. In fact, if somebody asked you 
what you would consider a fair price for the 
realisation of a project, which he is about to 
put to work, and which can be expected to 
cause the death of your child, you would im-
mediately denounce him to the police.  
 
We could try to move a step away from the 
specific cases, and ask, for instance, how 
much potential victims and potential relatives 
of victims would find it equitable to pay to an 
insurance fund compensating the relatives of 
possible future (by now unknown) victims of a 
project, which would be profitable to them-
selves. A project would be acceptable only if 
it could actually sponsor a fund of a size, 
which could compensate relatives to future 
victims, and still be profitable. This way it 
seems that we can calculate an indirect 
measure of the value of a lost life. In relation 
to public project like roads or bridges the 
compensation of relatives could simply be es-
timated as that which the political authorities 
would be willing to pay as compensation, if 
they had to. This is how the Danish Road Di-
rectorate justifies the use in cost-benefit 
analysis of virtual compensations to relatives 
around €600,000 per lost life (Vejdirektoratet 
2001; Finansministeriet 1999). 
 
However, the payments from the fund would 
not truly be compensating those who actually 
loose the relatives, nor the victims them-
selves, of course. Instead, one might set up a 
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 kind of gambling situation with losers and 
winners. In this case the price or value is not 
actually put on the loss of human lives, nor on 
the pain and sorrow of loosing a relative, but 
instead on the additional (or reduced) risk of 
loosing one’s own or a relative’s life that one 
is (voluntarily) ready to accept in order to ob-
tain a certain extra bonus, or “the value of the 
reduced probability of death that is experi-
enced by the affected population” (Viscusi & 
Aldy 2003, 6). This is our third candidate, 
then. This candidate is coherent with the 
Kantian line of argument, because it does not 
involve inappropriate pricing of priceless enti-
ties.  
 
The exact compensation for a loss of a hu-
man life would in this case be depending on 
the likelihood of loosing as well as on the ex-
tra benefit one expects to obtain. Conse-
quently, it cannot be the same in all kinds of 
situations. As the risk gets higher and the ex-
pected benefit gets lower, the price goes up 
and vice versa. Not linearly, but exponen-
tially. The first percent of extra risk will be 
less expensive than the next percent, and the 
last 5 percent between 95 and 100 will be im-
possible to pay. It is therefore important to 
notice in which part of the spectrum the incre-
mental risk is placed. 
 
Moreover, because the willingness to pay for 
risk reductions (or to accept risk increases) is 
fairly differentiated, not only across individu-
als (of different age, gender, health status, life 
quality, risk aversion, etc.) but also across in-
come groups and cultures, it is quite problem-
atic to use just one average measure of risk 
acceptance covering all risks in all situations 
at all places. The various surveys that have 
been made only tell about the indirectly re-
vealed preferences in a given sample of peo-
ple living under a specific set of circum-
stances accepting a specified kind of risk. 
These results cannot be generalized to a uni-
versal measure of a “statistical life” (Viscusi & 
Aldy 2003, 18), but are often used as such 
through so-called value transfers due to lack 
of time and money for differentiated studies 
(U.S. EPA 2000, 88).  
 
If risks are imposed involuntarily, i.e., without 
a stated consent, the price ought to be signifi-
cantly higher, of course (and the project 
should often be reconsidered). Other factors 
which affect risk perception are whether the 
risks are ordinary or catastrophic; occasional 
or continuous; immediate, delayed or latent; 
man-made or not; well-known or not; control-
lable or not; possible to avoid through avert-
ing behaviour or not; necessary or not (U.S. 
EPA 2000, 91; Pearce 2000, 12 & 18f). 
These dissimilarities make it even more prob-
lematic to make value transfers, and even 
more so because the studies made so far are 
not very helpful in identifying the relevant fac-
tors that could explain significant variations 
(Pearce 2000). If these factors were all well 
known, adequate adjustments could be made 
in cases of value transfer by the use of so-
called meta-analysis (or other more informal 
methods). 
 
The primary approach to estimating the value 
of an additional (or reduced) risk is hedonic 
pricing, first of all inferred from statistics on 
wages in jobs with higher than average mor-
tality risks, but price-risk trade-offs for seat-
belt use, cigarette smoking, automobile 
safety, bicycle helmets, etc. have also been 
studied (in so-called “averting behaviour” or 
“consumer market” studies). Contingent 
valuation methods have also been used. 
These studies can be designed in many dif-
ferent ways, some of which are not particu-
larly reliable (for a comprehensive account of 
methods and accomplished studies, see Vis-
cusi & Aldy 2003). The basic idea is to multi-
ply the additional (or reduced) risk by the ex-
tra (or reduced) income. For example, if 1000 
workers accept an extra wage of $5000 due 
to an additional risk of 0.001 percent, i.e., one 
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 of them can be expected to die during work, 
the value of a “statistical life” is $5 million 
(assuming, contrafactually, sufficient labour 
mobility and full information about actual 
risks). 
 
Half of the U.S. hedonic labour market stud-
ies surveyed by Viscusi & Aldy find the cost 
of a “statistical life” to fall within a range of $5-
12 million with a median of $7 million, but the 
studies vary significantly (Viscusi & Aldy 
2003, 18ff). This is not far from the value rec-
ommended in the U.S. EPA Guidelines for 
Preparing Economic Analysis: $6.1 million 
(U.S. EPA 2000, 90). In the EU-sponsored 
ExternE-project the recommended value for 
“statistical lives” lost or gained within the EU 
is somewhat lower: €3.1 million, which is esti-
mated on the basis of a survey of European 
studies (European Commission 1999, 232ff).  
 
It is worth noticing that by far the highest risk 
in any of the surveyed studies were 0.2 per-
cent; in most studies the risks were signifi-
cantly lower. If the price on risks grows expo-
nentially as the risks increase, the stated 
costs are only reasonable in low risk cases. 
At the same time the low risks makes peo-
ple’s behaviour quite unpredictable due to the 
difficulty of dealing consistently when con-
fronted with such small numbers. Moreover, 
the studies only include the potential victims’ 
own willingness to pay or accept, not those of 
their relatives, the inclusion of which may in-
crease the value significantly (Pearce 2000, 
26f). 
 
It is also worth noticing that the willingness to 
accept risks is highly income-elastic; in coun-
tries with a lower average income than in the 
U.S. the costs of additional risks are lower. 
Several cost-benefit analyses of global is-
sues, amongst which can be mentioned the 
ExternE-project, therefore adjust for this by 
multiplying the value of a “statistical life” by 
the ratio of the real GNP (GNP adjusted for 
purchasing power parity) in each country to 
the real GNP in the EU (European Commis-
sion 1999, 236ff).  
 
An important consequence of this highly con-
troversial adjustment is that damages causing 
losses of human lives will be much cheaper in 
poor countries. In Rwanda, for instance, the 
value of a “statistical life” is estimated to 
€58.000, whereas a “statistical life” in Norway 
is worth €3.5 million or some 60 times as 
much. This is quite obviously a problematic 
conclusion, particularly because the inhabi-
tants of Rwanda will not gain anything from 
having the negative impacts of climate 
change fall in their country (thus making costs 
cheaper), unlike richer countries with signifi-
cant emissions of greenhouse gasses. It is 
worth noticing, too, that the value of a 
“statistical life” would increase with economic 
growth, wherefore losses or gains of lives 
cannot be discounted for the same reason as 
other costs and benefits.  
 
The values from the described procedure 
could also be used in a calculation of an aver-
age global value of a “statistical life.” This is 
the kind of calculation lying behind the EU 
Commission’s DG Environment’s recommen-
dation to use a value around €1.0 million 
(2000 prices) with an upper estimate of €2.5 
million and a lower estimate of €0.65 million 
(European Commission 1999 and 2001). 
 
A fourth and a fifth candidate should be men-
tioned, if only in passing, namely life-years 
lost and life-years remaining. In both cases it 
is not life as such that is valued, nor the incre-
mental risk of loosing it, but the expected 
number of life-years lost or gained. Although 
many of the issues already mentioned are 
relevant in these cases as well, there are a 
couple of important differences, too. First of 
all, age is more important in these cases. In 
the first case (life years lost) children’s deaths 
are much more costly than the death of older 
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 people, because more life years are lost. In 
the second case (life years remaining) one 
can expect dissimilar reactions from people at 
different ages, particularly in cases of delayed 
and latent risks.  
 
Generally speaking, there is no single value 
to attach to the loss (or saving) of a human 
life. There are various ways to estimate 
losses based on different sets of assump-
tions. Some of these differentiate considera-
bly between different groups of people, due to 
differences in income, age, etc., whereas oth-
ers seek averages. There is not one ap-
proach which is best in all respects. This is 
not a result one should be sad about, how-
ever. It only makes it more obvious that it is a 
political task to make decisions – including 
the selection of which methodology (if any) to 
rely on. 
 
Moreover, to talk about “the value of a life” or 
“the value of a statistical life” is bewildering at 
best (cf. also OMB 1996, 25f). The fact is that 
I have not come across any convincing argu-
ments on how to monetise the loss of human 
lives. After all, it is only circumstantial matters 
that are monetised: the value of lost labour, 
incremental costs of medical treatment, the 
value of risk avoidance, the compensation of 
relatives, etc., not the loss of a human life it-
self. Nobody can be compensated properly 
for their own death. Consequently, when con-
structing a cost-benefit analysis one should 
always make a separate account of expected 
losses or gains of human lives.  
 
The choice of exposing factions of citizens to 
increased risks due to the provision of a cer-
tain good is basically a social task, based on 
weightings of monetised as well as non-
monetised costs and benefits, not simply an 
aggregation of individual accounts. Individual 
valuations can only give decision makers 
some hints about their willingness to back up 
decisions.  
Monetising critical and unique resources 
 
It is generally assumed in cost-benefit analy-
sis that goods and resources can be substi-
tuted without limitation. “If you don’t eat one 
species of fish, you can eat another species 
of fish,” as the American economist Robert 
Solow has put it, and if there are no fish left at 
all, you can eat something else. All resources 
are considered “fungible” (Solow 1993, 181); 
they can be replaced, and will be replaced 
without loss by others, whenever the price is 
right. In cost-benefit accounts it is therefore 
crucial to put the correct economic value on 
all kinds of resources in order to find the most 
economically sound solutions in cases of 
market failure. 
 
There is one problem, though, which most 
economists recognize: the problem of critical 
resources, i.e., basic life-support resources 
like clean water or ecosystem stability (or re-
silience) which cannot be substituted for by 
anything else, and the loss of which may be 
irreversible or at least damaging for a signifi-
cant period of time. This is a problem, which 
has turned up particularly in relation to the 
question of sustainability. Some hard core 
economists, supporting the weakest possible 
concept of sustainability, have argued that 
this is not a real problem, because the price 
of these resources will rise if they become 
sparse. This is not altogether convincing, 
however. Partly because many decisions are 
made on the basis of a very short time hori-
zon, from which future damages are not visi-
ble. Partly because some non-substitutable 
resources just do not come out in large num-
bers. Still, it is not an easy task to identify the 
critical resources, which are not likely to be 
preserved in an appropriate way by the mar-
ket mechanisms (Turner & Pearce 1993, Hol-
land 1997, Holland 1999, Ekins et al. 2003, 
Ekins 2003, De Groot et al. 2003, Chiesura & 
De Groot 2003). 
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 I have suggested that we distinguish between 
three kinds of resources as presented in Fig-
ure 2 (Arler 2001 and 2003) Firstly, there are 
exchangeable resources, which can be sub-
stituted for by other resources, as long as 
there are enough of these with sufficiently 
similar qualities, without any further problems. 
The standard example is fossil fuels, which 
can, in principle, be substituted for by other 
energy sources. Nobody will miss coal, if 
there is energy enough to collect from other 
sources.  
 
Similarly, ordinary consumer goods are regu-
larly exchanged and substituted for, and their 
value mainly depends on transitory needs 
and preferences. These are the kinds of re-
sources whose destiny can be safely left to 
market mechanisms (or similar social de-
vices) to determine. 
Figure 2.  The three kinds of resources: exchangeable, critical, and unique. 
e.g. significant  
buildings or works of  
art, local populations 
of significant 
species 
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 Critical resources, on the other hand, are not 
so easy to do without, no matter which kinds 
of life style future generations are going to 
choose. Just like us, they will need sufficiently 
clean air and water as well as other basic re-
sources, which are fundamental to human be-
ings as biological creatures. The line between 
exchangeable and critical resources is a 
fuzzy one, however, because it remains an 
open question to what extent precaution 
needs to be taken. How clean is sufficiently 
clean, for instance? How many risks are we 
willing to take – or rather: let future genera-
tions take? These are to large extent cultural 
questions, and the answers very much de-
pend on a specific culture’s attitude towards 
risks and environmental quality.  
 
Similarly, although it is possible to survive as 
biological creatures with a fairly limited 
amount of resources, it may not be possible 
to keep up the living standards of today. In 
this sense the identification of critical re-
sources depends on which baseline living 
standard is chosen. It also very much de-
pends on local circumstances, unless it is as-
sumed that people should simply move away 
from a locality, when resources, which are 
critical for human life in this area, are con-
sumed or otherwise damaged. Finally, if the 
well-being of (some) others species are in-
cluded in the concept of sustainability 
(Dobson 1998), this would expand the num-
ber of critical resources significantly. 
 
The third category of resources is unique re-
sources. These are resources which are not 
indispensable for our survival as biological 
creatures, not even for a continuation of high 
living standards, but only for particular cul-
tures’ identity. They cannot be exchanged or 
substituted as simply as more ordinary things. 
Obvious examples are spectacular biological 
species or biodiversity in general, rare eco-
system-types, old and significant cultural 
creations, historically important sites, etc. 
Several of these are listed as heritage values 
on a local, national, or global level. Locally or 
nationally, there may also be a number of val-
ues, the fate of which is not left to be deter-
mined by private preferences. It may be de-
cided, for instance, that preservation of clean 
ground water is considered to be so important 
for a specific community that it should not be 
submitted to pressure from market forces. 
This is the reason why it was decided in the 
U.S. of the early 70’s not to use cost-benefit 
analysis before making policies related to the 
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act (Cropper 
and Oakes 1992, 675; Arrow et al. 1996, 4) 
as well as the Endangered Species Act (Nash 
1989).  
 
Again, there is no clear-cut line between the 
unique resources and two other kinds. Some 
resources are certainly more unique than oth-
ers, and the precise list is inevitably going to 
change along with the cultural changes in 
general. However, the basic point is that the 
identification of unique resources is a com-
mon – cultural and political – task, where due 
respect ought to be given to inputs from ex-
perts and connoisseurs, not a consumer is-
sue. It is more related to the question of who 
we are rather than to what we prefer to have 
(Sandel 1982, 180). This is exactly the rea-
son why unique resources are so difficult to 
deal with in cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Monetization may not be totally out of the 
question, though. If an attachment of eco-
nomic value appears to be appropriate for 
some good reason, it should not be based 
simply on the individual’s private preferences, 
however. Instead, it should be the result of a 
common deliberation about a particular com-
munity’s priorities, where everybody behaves 
as a citizen, and not simply as a self-
interested consumer (Sagoff 1998). It should 
reflect what the citizens or their (ideally: well-
informed and virtuous) representatives have 
agreed to consider important – or made com-
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 promises about – after an open process of 
deliberation in a Habermasian spirit, not an 
aggregation of what isolated individuals may 
happen to wish for themselves. Even though 
it is likely that there will be a certain amount 
of disagreement, and procedural justice 
therefore becomes a separate issue (Miller 
1999), it is basically not a question about the 
quantity of supporting persons or feelings, but 
about the quality of supporting arguments. 
What is important, too, is to realize that this 
kind of valuation cannot be made once and 
for all; inevitably, it will change with the cir-
cumstances.  
 
The distributive problem 
 
Distribution  
within generations 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, cost-
benefit analysis relies on the potential Pareto-
improvement rule stating that policies and 
projects should be adopted if and only if the 
net benefits are positive, or, in accordance 
with the Kaldor/Hicks criterion, if and only if 
those who are likely to gain from it can be ex-
pected, in principle, to be able to compensate 
those who are likely to lose, and still be better 
off than before.  
 
The potential Pareto-improvement rule and 
the Kaldor/Hicks criterion both appear quite 
appalling. How can the potential compensa-
tion of victims be used as a justification, if the 
victims are not actually compensated? There 
is also a great amount of build-in conserva-
tism in cost-benefit analysis. Due to the fun-
damental and sovereign criterion of potential 
Pareto-improvement, status quo, the existing 
equilibrium is used as baseline, no matter 
how inequitable this may seem. If, to use an 
extreme example, a society is dominated by a 
few very rich companies or individuals, due to 
some dim occurrences in the past, whereas 
the rest of the population live in extreme pov-
erty, a cost-benefit analysis would recom-
mend a project which made the oligarchs so 
much richer that they could, in principle, com-
pensate the losers among the poor people. 
Whatever happened before the present situa-
tion is considered as “sunken” costs and 
benefits and not included in the calculation. 
 
The potential Pareto-improvement rule and 
the Kaldor/Hicks criterion are usually de-
fended by the following arguments (cf. Board-
man et al. 1996, 32f). Firstly, when society as 
a whole becomes richer the worst off mem-
bers of society are likely to benefit. Even if a 
more unequal distribution results from using 
the rule in a certain case, the poorest mem-
bers of society will still be better off than they 
would have been without this application. If a 
more equal redistribution is wished for, this 
will be easier to accomplish separately when 
society becomes richer.  
 
Secondly, different distributions will typically 
result in different sets of winners and losers, 
and if the economy as a whole grows due to 
the use of the potential Pareto-improvement 
rule, there will be more places where one can 
win. The average agent is an obvious winner, 
but even poor people can be expected to be 
able to improve their situation.  
 
Thirdly, if actual compensations should be 
provided in detail from every winner to every 
loser, this would result in huge transaction 
costs. In most cases they do not know each 
other, and typically it is not even obvious who 
is affected, neither ex ante nor ex post, due to 
unclear lines of causality, uncertainty about 
the baseline case, etc. A vast bureaucracy 
would be needed in order to record not only 
each and every single cost and benefit sepa-
rately but also exactly where, when, and on 
whom they fall, and to guarantee that the 
transfers were actually carried out.  
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 These are all quite reasonable arguments un-
der certain circumstances. Their validity de-
pends, first of all, on the actual presence of 
welfare regulations that deals with serious 
distributive consequences otherwise 
(Campen 1986, 40). This is not always the 
case, of course. So, even though, theoreti-
cally, everybody may have a better chance of 
improving his or her situation when the econ-
omy is thriving, it is still necessary to give de-
cision-makers a clear picture of where the 
costs and benefits are landing. After all, cost 
benefit analysis cannot abolish the rights of 
citizens, including private property rights, and 
compensation claims are often unavoidable.  
 
In cross-national settings, where no regular 
compensatory mechanisms are operational, 
the use of the potential Pareto-improvement 
criterion becomes even more controversial. If 
all impacts of a certain project are placed in 
poor countries, where costs - including 
“statistical lives” – are cheap, while all bene-
fits are moved to members of rich countries, 
this may be an improvement when measured 
in economic terms, but would appear offend-
ing in most people’s opinion. 
 
Even when no-one’s legal rights are threat-
ened by a project or policy, it is still important 
to identify winners and losers. If, for instance, 
disproportionately high costs of a project or 
policy are borne by a limited group of people, 
maybe even some of the worst off people in 
society, this would in itself be a good reason 
for changing or rejecting the project or policy. 
This is also reflected in the economic assess-
ment guidelines of the U.S. OMB and EPA 
(U.S. OMB, 16; U.S. EPA, Chp. 9) as well as 
in the U.K.  
 
Treasury Green Book, although none of these 
recommend a specific methodology. Both 
sets of guidelines are open for the possibility 
that various groups or sub-populations are 
weighted differently in impact assessment 
analyses, on the basis of separate equity as-
sessments. Local costs and benefits, or costs 
and benefits falling on particularly disadvan-
taged people, for example, may thus be given 
more weight in the account. The identification 
and definition of relevant sub-groups is not an 
easy job, though, as can be seen, for in-
stance, in the attempt to set up a framework 
in the U.S. EPA Guidelines. 
 
It does not always make a case better, if real 
(instead of potential) Pareto-improvement is 
used as criterion. Sometimes this may actu-
ally worsen things. The reason is that ques-
tions of equity typically are ignored in cost-
benefit analysis. For instance, in some as-
sessments of what would count as reason-
able policy reactions to the increasing green-
house effect it is assumed that status quo 
and ‘normal’ economic development function 
as baseline for negotiations. In this case any 
cut in the use of fossil fuels in order to slow 
climate change would hurt countries like 
Saudi Arabia, USA, Russia or China with 
large deposits of oil, gas, or coal.  
 
According to the actual Pareto-improvement 
scheme these countries should be compen-
sated for their losses – as is often the case 
when agreements are international (Azar 
2000). Who should compensate them, then? 
The winners, of course. Who are they? Those 
countries, or individuals, who benefit from the 
abatement, i.e., the poorest people who do 
not have enough economic and technological 
means to avoid the negative impacts of an in-
creasing greenhouse effect.  
 
Another distributive problem related to cost-
benefit analysis is that willingness to pay is 
depending on ability to pay. Wealthy people’s 
wishes count more than poor people’s 
wishes. The standard justification is, firstly, 
that this just reflects the situation on the mar-
ket, which cost-benefit analysis is supposed 
to imitate. If this is not equitable, it has to be 
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 dealt with otherwise. Secondly, as Alfred Mar-
shall pointed out, in many cases the sheer 
number of people influencing the market 
situation tends to diminish the influence of 
particular groups (Marshall 1920/1946, 19). 
 
Still, it is necessary to assess whether this ar-
gument is applicable in each particular case. 
This leaves us once again with two ways to 
deal with the problem in relation to cost-
benefit analysis. Either one can argue that 
cost-benefit analysis should not pay much at-
tention to this problem, but stick to its stan-
dard methodology and leave it to the deci-
sion-makers to take care of the problem oth-
erwise, or one can insist that this concern 
should be reflected explicitly in the analysis, 
for instance, by “valuing the poor individual’s 
extra dollar higher than the rich individ-
ual’s” (Toth, 132). 
 
Distributions across generations 
 
There are several issues where the gainers 
and the losers, the tortfeasors and the nega-
tively affected parties, are situated in different 
generations. The increasing greenhouse ef-
fect is the most obvious example, but there 
are many others: irreversible losses of biodi-
versity, radioactive waste from nuclear plants, 
losses of non-renewable resources like fossil 
fuels, ground water pollution, etc. 
 
It is worth noticing that when we are talking 
about equitable distribution across genera-
tions it no longer makes sense to use the 
homo economicus construct exclusively as 
starting point. If everybody acted as egocen-
tric busybodies only looking for mutual advan-
tage contracts, future generations would be 
the first to loose (Barry 1989, 189ff). They will 
never be able to do anything for us, nor will 
they ever be able to harm us in any serious 
way. It has been argued, though, that the re-
lation between generations can be conceived 
of as a contract involving three currently living 
and equally selfish generations (Gauthier 
1986), and that the different generational in-
terests would balance each other in a way 
similar to the equilibrium of opposing interests 
on the market. However, if everybody really 
were as selfish as it is assumed in economic 
calculations, it would be quite obvious to drop 
all obligations to future people a number of 
generations away. In this case it would be 
easy to ignore problems that could be kept 
away for a certain amount of time.  
 
According to Layard & Glaister this is actually 
the position of most economists, who are only 
willing to judge projects in terms of present 
welfare effects. Layard and Glaister them-
selves support the opposite view that cost-
benefit analysis “aims to throw light on what 
is right,” and, accordingly, cannot find any ex-
cuse for ignoring future generations (Layard 
& Glaister 1996, 33). A parallel distinction can 
also be found in the chapter on intertemporal 
equity and discounting in the IPCC Working 
Group III report from 1996 (Arrow et al. 
1996): the “descriptive” approach begins with 
evidence from actual decisions, whatever 
ethical positions these may happen to ex-
press, whereas the “prescriptive” approach 
begins with ethical considerations. This way 
of constructing the difference is somewhat 
confusing, however, because the so-called 
descriptive approach actually does take a 
specific ethical stance. It is simply using the 
potential Pareto-improvement criterion in a 
cross-generational context, despite the obvi-
ous lack of direct compensatory mechanisms. 
In general, the supporters of this approach 
are assuming that a continuous economic 
growth will be in the interest of future genera-
tions as well. 
 
All differences apart, all parties do agree that 
future costs and benefits should not count as 
much as current ones. Future net benefits 
should be discounted in order to find the net 
present value. Estimated future costs and 
 Research Report 4 2006 
 benefits are accordingly decreased in current 
calculations by a discount factor 1/(1+r)t 
where r is the discount rate and t is a time in-
dex.  
 
Several reasons have been put forward in de-
fence of this claim. Firstly, it is obvious that 
somehow we have to reduce the influence of 
future consequences on current decisions. 
Otherwise, the sheer weight of costs and 
benefits of an infinite or at least extremely 
vast number of future people may happen to 
be so colossal that impacts on present gen-
erations would count next to nothing, and the 
required savings rate would become absurdly 
high (Arrow 1999).  
 
By discounting future impacts, current peo-
ple’s interests become more visible in the cal-
culation. Discounting all kinds of future con-
sequences without differentiation is a way too 
high prize to pay on this account, however. 
After all, one of the basic points in “doing the 
right thing” in relation to future generations is 
to avoid reducing the spectrum of attractive 
opportunities in order to keep up the possibil-
ity of welfare (or a good life) for time to come. 
This point is totally blurred if all future conse-
quences are discounted on an equal basis. 
Likewise, equity across generations does not 
demand that the current generation’s needs 
are sacrificed, but only that different genera-
tions have comparable opportunities. 
 
Secondly, it is assumed that people in gen-
eral prefer to have current needs and wants 
satisfied rather than those they may have in 
the future. People are believed to be so impa-
tient that they are not willing to save as much 
for the future as a cool calculation would ad-
vise them to do. This is usually referred to as 
the pure time preference argument, and is of-
ten transferred from the individual level to so-
ciety at large. For example, the U.K. Treasury 
refers to it in the following naïve way: “Society 
as a whole (sic!) prefers to receive goods and 
services sooner than later, and to defer costs 
to future generations” (U.K. Treasury 2000, 
26). The pure time preference argument is 
not convincing even for individuals. Of course 
there are individuals with a short planning ho-
rizon, or people who believe that their self at 
time t0 is so different from the future self at 
time t1, that this is actually a different person, 
whom the self at t0 only feels partly responsi-
ble for. But from a societal point of view, why 
should the person’s needs (or preferences) at 
t1 be less important than the person’s needs 
at t0? The argument loses all credibility in the 
case of cross-generational distribution, where 
costs and benefits fall on different sets of 
people no matter how much they are consid-
ered as part of the same “society as a whole.” 
 
Thirdly, and this is a far more compelling ar-
gument, technological improvement and eco-
nomic growth in society is likely to make peo-
ple richer in the future, at least in the near fu-
ture, and at least in terms of consumer 
goods. If future people are expected to be 
richer than we are, it does not seem equitable 
that we should use large sums to improve 
their welfare further, for instance, by avoiding 
unfortunate environmental impacts. More-
over, if we could invest our money in projects 
that are more profitable, this may be to the 
advantage of future people, too.  
 
Consequently, there should be some propor-
tion in current people’s effort; future people’s 
costs should be seen in relation to their pre-
sumably higher income, which may be as-
sumed also to result in a lower marginal utility 
of each extra gain (unless it is believed that 
future people are more difficult to satisfy due 
to more expensive tastes which current peo-
ple ought to support). Future costs and bene-
fits should be discounted, accordingly, at the 
expected rate of economic growth or growth 
of consumption (g) multiplied by the pre-
sumed elasticity of marginal utility (θ). 
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 Notice that this argument, unlike the second 
one, is an argument from equity. It is also an 
argument, however, which is based on as-
sumptions that may happen to be quite pre-
carious. Whereas it is true that the general 
trend for several hundred years has been one 
of economic growth, it is no longer quite as 
obvious that this trend will continue to be 
dominant hundreds of years from now. After 
all, several of the key resources in the current 
period of exceptional economic growth have 
become more difficult to extract; fossil fuels 
being the primary case. Although science and 
technology can be expected to continue to 
improve, and thus to be finding new means 
and paths, the sheer size of an economy sev-
eral times bigger than the current one makes 
the whole scenario rather incalculable – with 
an interest rate of 6 percent (quite common in 
cost-benefit calculations) we are talking about 
an economy some 18 times bigger then the 
current one within half a century. Not even a 
radical decoupling of economic and material 
growth would seem to suffice. Moreover, 
even though future people may happen to be 
wealthier in terms of consumer goods they 
may also be poorer in terms on non-
monetised goods. The argument thus as-
sumes that each and every good can be sub-
stituted for by something else.  
 
Fourthly, it can be argued that current people 
care less and less about future people the 
further away these people live, because we 
know less and less about who they are and 
what they cherish. In the long run, our effort 
to improve the conditions of future people 
may not hit the target at all, because they 
may not share our values or preferences. The 
effort should therefore not have the same pri-
ority as efforts to help current people who can 
be asked about their needs and wants. Peo-
ple in the far future can be compared to peo-
ple on the other side of the globe or to current 
people with a way of life very different from 
our own. There seems to be an empathetic 
distance. Discounting their costs and benefits 
could be seen as a reflection of our lack of in-
terest due to the plausible diminishing com-
patibility of our and their cultural values. 
 
This argument is supported by the fact that, in 
certain cases, a large part of the beneficiaries 
will be descendants of current people of the 
third world. There will be relatively more peo-
ple in these countries in the future, and these 
people will be more vulnerable to climate 
change than future rich people in the industri-
alized countries. Policies of greenhouse gas 
mitigation, in particular, may thus be likened 
to foreign aid programs (Schelling 1999). If 
we do not give much support to poor people 
in other countries today, why should we sup-
port their probably somewhat richer descen-
dants more thoroughly? If we actually want to 
make sacrifices in order to give more help to 
the poor people of the world, why not invest 
in immediate improvement instead? If this 
leads to economic development today, future 
people in these parts of the world would also 
be less vulnerable to climate change.  
 
At least two arguments can be put forward 
against this kind of reasoning. The analogy 
between future people and current people 
with a different culture is misleading at one 
point: we are not directly responsible for the 
fate of current people in other parts of the 
world, whereas we do hold the destiny of fu-
ture people in our hand. Responsibility mat-
ters. Moreover, we do have the possibility of 
influencing future culture to a larger degree 
than current culture in foreign countries. They 
may not be as foreign to us as the argument 
assumes, but should rather be seen as de-
scendants of a common culture of argument. 
It should be noticed, also, that this line of ar-
gument is more suitable for communitarians 
(de-Shalit 1995) than for economists working 
in the neoclassical tradition, trying to reduce 
common values to private preferences. For 
them emphatic distance cannot be an issue, 
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 and, consequently, no serious reason for dis-
counting future costs and benefits. 
 
A fifth reason given for discounting is that fu-
ture costs and benefits are more uncertain. 
Unforeseeable events like war, natural disas-
ters, etc. may happen to change the whole 
scheme. Likewise, if we do a lot for the far fu-
ture, we cannot be sure that the generations 
in between will not do what mainstream 
economists expect them to do: look at their 
own advantage and let go of the generations 
further down the road. The further away in 
time we look the more probable is it that 
something will be happening in he meantime. 
Discounting may appear to be a solution to 
this problem, because it reflects the diminish-
ing ability to foresee the situation of future 
people. A problem with this solution is that it 
confuses two separate issues: the risk of fu-
ture benefits and the length of time until they 
materialize (U.S. EPA 2000, 37; Møller 2003). 
Not all current investments are equally risky, 
so this can hardly be the basis for the use of 
a general discount rate, which works from 
day one.  
 
Short term discounting cannot be equalized 
with long term discounting. In the second 
case the use of even a modest discount rate 
will erase remote impacts from current ac-
counts. For this reason several authors have 
suggested lowering the discount rate over the 
years until it is close to zero in the distant fu-
ture (cf. several contributions in Portney & 
Weyant 1999; U.K. Treasury 2000). One 
problem with this approach is that it easily 
leads to the so-called time inconsistency 
problem: the discount rate would have to be 
changed every time a new planning process 
begins, and the rate in a new plan would nec-
essarily contradict those in older plans. This 
does not appear to be too much of a problem, 
though. A more radical solutions would be to 
drop some of the basic assumptions in cost-
benefit analysis altogether in relation to deci-
sion making in cases like the increasing 
greenhouse effect, where the most serious 
impacts can be expected to lie in the far fu-
ture, and concentrate on the basic questions 
of equity instead (Lind & Schuler 1998).  
 
The question of discounting is handled very 
unevenly by different institutions and ana-
lysts. The U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget recommends a discount rate of 7 per-
cent (U.S. OMB 1992 and 1996), but in the 
latest draft of new guidelines they recom-
mend to use a 3 percent rate as well (OMB 
2003). The U.S. EPA recommends a general 
2-3 percent rate for intra-generational dis-
counting (equal to the historical records of the 
consumption rate of interest). It is also recom-
mended that a 7 percent rate is used in sensi-
tivity tests, together with a “no discounting 
scenario” (without value summation) in rela-
tion to inter-generational issues like the in-
creasing greenhouse effect (U.S. EPA 2000, 
48 and 52). The British Green Book recom-
mends a short term (<30 years) discount rate 
of 3.5 percent, calculated on the basis of a) 
pure rate of consumption together with catas-
trophe risk: 1.5 percent, plus b) the annual 
growth in per capita consumption: 2 percent; 
in relation to long-term effects it is recom-
mended to use a declining discount rate (U.K. 
Treasury 2000, 97ff). All of this is significantly 
lower than recommendations from previous 
Treasury guidelines. The ExternE-project rec-
ommends a 3 percent discount rate (using 0 
and 10 percent rates in sensitivity tests), but 
uses other rates in certain situations 
(European Commission 1999, 64f). The Dan-
ish Ministry of Finance recommends a gen-
eral discount rate of 6 percent (Finansmini-
steriet 1999, Appendix C), based on esti-
mates of the opportunity costs of capital, i.e., 
the missed potential returns from present al-
ternative (private) investments. Reports from 
the Danish Ministry of the Environment, on 
the other hand, recommend a discount rate of 
3 and 2 percent respectively, but it is also 
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 recommended that projects should yield an 
effective dividend of at least 5 percent (Møller 
et al. 2000, Møller 2003). 
 
The next question to turn up is this: should all 
costs and benefits be discounted at the same 
rate, or should some costs or benefits be 
treated separately? If future people are actu-
ally going to be as rich as it is assumed by 
analysts, who prefer a high discount rate, this 
will undoubtedly influence the combination of 
preferred goods. Let us assume, for the sake 
of argument, that people living a couple of 
hundred years from now are going to be ten 
(or more) times richer than current people (in 
industrialised countries), as the use of even a 
fairly low rate of interest would imply. In this 
case it seems quite absurd to think that they 
are simply going to want ten times as many 
cars, washing machines, and egg boilers as 
today. Even if we assume that ordinary re-
source shortages are not going to prevent 
them from having these items (and this may 
happen to be a shaky assumption), is seems 
quite obvious that the preferred combination 
of desired goods will change.  
 
For instance, it seems likely that areas with a 
modest human impact and high biological di-
versity will be scarce in the future and there-
fore also economically valuable. This is a pat-
tern already observed to some extent in cur-
rent industrialised countries. Should this not 
be reflected in cost-benefit analysis, for ex-
ample, by excluding these kinds of goods 
from discounting? The U.S. Office of Man-
agement and Budget recommends that these 
two issues are dealt with separately (U.S. 
OMB 1996, 12), whereas others recommend 
that scarce environmental goods are ex-
empted from discounting (U.K. Treasury 
2000, 25) – or even discounted at a negative 
rate. 
 
Another issue which could be dealt with sepa-
rately is potential losses of human lives. If we 
assume that these losses are monetised as 
“statistical lives,” and that a discount rate of, 
say, 5 percent is used, one life lost today 
would count more than 100 lives lost a cen-
tury from now. Methodology apart, it is not 
obvious at all what could make this right. 
Similarly, a foreseeable catastrophic event in 
the far future cannot be treated on a par with 
some minor welfare changes over a long pe-
riod. 
 
The choice of discount rate has significant im-
pact on the assessment of long terms pro-
jects and policies. There is not one single rate 
which can be recommended without further 
qualification. In relation to intergenerational 
issues the choice is basically a matter of eq-
uity. When a high rate is chosen this is usu-
ally done on the basis of very optimistic as-
sumptions about continuous economic growth 
and unlimited substitutability of resources – 
often combined with a lack of interest in the 
destiny of future people (disguised as a high 
“societal pure time preference”). On the other 
hand, the choice of a low rate (in general or in 
relation to specific goods) signals less opti-
mism, more concern for futurity and/or for 
preservation of critical and unique resources. 
The use of several different rates (at least in 
sensitivity tests) designates that this is not a 
question which is appropriate for economists 
to deal with on their own. 
 
Consumer sovereignty 
and the problem of 
“rational fools” 
 
It is a basic assumption in cost-benefit analy-
sis, as well as in welfare economics in gen-
eral, that valuations should be based on pref-
erences as they happen to be, or to be more 
precise: as they are revealed through the 
consumers’ willingness to pay on the market. 
The consumer is considered sovereign, no 
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 matter what he or she may happen to prefer. 
Preferences are treated as exogenous facts, 
not as preliminary assumptions which may be 
changed through experience and deliberation 
(Sagoff 1984, 1988 & 1996; Norton et al. 
1998).  
 
The rationality of economic man is thus lim-
ited to the ability to pursue arational goals the 
most efficient way, and does not include hav-
ing the most well-considered values, goals 
and ambitions. Economic agents are treated 
as “rational fools” (to use Amartya Sen’s 
phrase): their subjective preferences, ex-
pressed in their willingness to pay, are taken 
seriously, but not their agency, i.e., their 
status as presumably reasonable and reflec-
tive fellow human beings (Sen 1987, 15ff and 
40ff; Sen 1997, 84ff).  
 
The rationality of cost-benefit analysis is lim-
ited to calculations based on revealed prefer-
ences, and does not extend to considering 
the reasonableness of values, goals and am-
bitions of individuals. Neither welfare eco-
nomics in general nor cost-benefit analysis 
are developing arguments concerning the 
good life. Most economists rely on the, basi-
cally deontological, principle of consumer 
sovereignty – typically without trying to con-
struct a serious defense – although their con-
sequentialist agenda actually force them to 
overrule the principle whenever there is even 
the smallest gain to achieve. 
 
This is all very much in line with preference 
utilitarianism and to a large extent with the 
hedonistic utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. 
In a defence of utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 
did put forward a point, however, which has 
troubled sensitive utilitarians ever since: Util-
ity is not simply a matter of quantity (number 
of happy feelings times intensity times dura-
tion), but also of quality. We have to admit, he 
wrote in a famous passage, that, after all, we 
do consider it better to be a dissatisfied Soc-
rates than a happy pig (Mill 1861). There are 
actually two issues involved. Firstly, there is 
the problem whether the commodities we ac-
quire actually help us in leading a good life. 
Secondly, there is the problem of selfishness: 
if economics endorse an image of man as a 
self-absorbed pleasure machine, then how 
about the so-called “higher” feelings towards 
fellow humans and other species? Both were 
issues that preoccupied the early neoclassi-
cal economists. All of them agreed with Mill 
on this particular point, and found it neces-
sary to come up with a satisfying answer.   
 
Let us begin with the first of the two issues. 
Jevons was quite explicit in his answer to 
Mill’s challenge. Economy deals only with the 
“lowest rank of feelings,” he wrote. It is a cal-
culus of utility that aims only at supplying the 
“ordinary wants of man” at the least cost of la-
bour (Jevons, 32). A certain “higher” kind of 
consideration is needed in order to determine 
how we may best employ our wealth for the 
good of others as well as ourselves. We do 
need the lower calculus, however, in order to 
achive “the utmost good in matters of moral 
indifference,” i.e., where the higher calculus 
gives no prohibition (ibid.). 
 
At the same time, however, we ought to be 
aware of a general tendency which the 
economist Senior had already by then named 
“the Law of Variety.” When the necessities of 
life are few and simple, human beings are 
soon satisfied, and desire to extend their 
range of enjoyment. First they vary their food; 
later on they seek variety and elegance in 
dress, in buildings and ornament. In general, 
every satisfaction of “lower wants” creates 
new desires of a “higher character.” The high-
est grade in the scale of wants, namely 
“pleasure derived from the beauties of nature 
and art, is usually confined to men who are 
exempted from all the lower privations” 
(Jevons, III.11). Economy is not in itself fit to 
deal with these matters, but it provides the 
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 basis for the development of higher needs 
when guaranteeing that necessities are pro-
duced in the most efficient way. 
 
Alfred Marshall argues along quite similar 
lines. He agrees with Aristotle that the highest 
good or the “fulness of life” lies in “the devel-
opment and activity of as many and as high 
faculties as possible.” A decent income 
earned by steady work is the proper founda-
tion for this, because it helps one to develop 
the right kind of “habits of body, mind, and 
spirit.” This is where economics are most 
helpful, because increases in wealth add to 
“the fulness and nobility of human life.” As 
soon as the necessaries of life are provided, 
with a helping hand from economics, every-
one can begin to, or rather: ought to seek to 
“increase the beauty of things in his posses-
sion rather than their number or their magnifi-
cence” (Marshall, 1920/1946, 136).  
 
However, there does seem to be a threshold 
beyond which the satisfaction of “real wants” 
is threatened by the growth of a “desire for 
wealth as a means of display.” Real goods 
are crowded out by the kinds of goods which 
Fred Hirsch much later labelled “positio-
nal” (Hirsch 1977). This is an echo of Aristotle 
and Rousseau, but also of Adam Smith, the 
moral philosopher warning against vanity and 
greed. The world would go much better, Mar-
shall notices, if everyone were satisfied with 
“fewer and simpler things,” and instead “take 
trouble in selecting them for their real 
beauty” (Marshall, 1920/1946, 136f). Beyond 
a certain point utility becomes mere ophelim-
ity, economic welfare and happiness no 
longer walk hand in hand along the same 
path, and economics begin to loose credibility 
as the primary lever for the good life (cf. also 
Sagoff 1998, 220; O’Neill 1998, 53ff). 
 
It is worth noticing that economists like Jev-
ons, Marshall and Pareto thus apply a double 
standard. On the one hand, there are market 
values (or ophelimities) based on consumer 
preferences. On the other hand, there is the 
estimation of utility based on thorough reflec-
tion. Even though they believe that the two 
standards tend to converge due to the Law of 
Variety (or similar predispositions), this may 
not always be the case. Many public projects 
deal, directly or indirectly, with goods that 
many people may not be well acquainted 
with, such as, say, biodiversity and preserva-
tion of species in undisturbed areas. Or they 
may not be truly aware of the consequences 
of their choices. The question is, then, why 
people’s preferences should be offered such 
a crucial role in decision making. After all, 
wouldn’t we all favour a model where our 
well-considered and well-founded value judg-
ments were represented rather than the pref-
erences we simply happen to have for the 
time being? If so, those models should be 
chosen for decision making where everybody 
is offered a chance of refining their valuations 
through learning, discussion and deliberation. 
This is not the case in standard cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
The problem of social 
motives 
 
In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals David Hume noticed that human be-
ings, in spite of their apparent selfishness, of-
ten take an interest in the wellbeing of other 
people, even in the remotest cases: “A recent 
event or piece of news, by which the fate of 
states, provinces or many individuals is af-
fected, is extremely interesting even to those 
whose welfare is not immediately engaged 
(…) The interests of society appears, on this 
occasion, to be in some degree the interest of 
each individual” (Hume 1751/1966, 58). For 
this reason he concluded that human beings, 
alongside their “self-love,” have some kind of 
altruistic inclination, which leads them to act 
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 in ways that are not selfish, sometimes even 
detrimental to their own interest. On the other 
hand, was Edgeworth not quite right when he 
pointed out that “The first principle of Eco-
nomics is that every agent is actuated only by 
self-interest” (Edgeworth 1881, 16)? So the 
second issue is: how does cost-benefit analy-
sis cope with the presence of what Mill called 
“higher” motives and with the fact that most 
people consider it to be not only meritorious, 
but often even obligatory to act on the basis 
of these “higher” motives?  
 
Cost-benefit analysts often deal with this 
problem in two steps. The first step is to re-
duce the “higher” social motives to private 
preferences. If an individual finds the health 
or happiness of others important enough to 
influence his or her market behaviour, he or 
she simply reveals a preference for the well-
being of others. It can thus be treated as yet 
another preference the intensity of which can 
be measured through the individual’s willing-
ness to pay. One need not even assume that 
the individual has a hidden selfish motive or a 
personal satisfaction from helping others – 
feeling the “warm glow” of doing good. It is 
enough just to say that there is a certain 
black box preference which is revealed 
through the individual’s market behaviour.  
 
Secondly, the very calculation made by 
economists, including cost-benefit analysis, is 
in itself the best way of acting in accordance 
with social motives, because it makes the sat-
isfaction of preferences more Pareto efficient, 
and therefore improves total utility. Edge-
worth, for instance, borrowed the distinction 
between egoistic and universal hedonism 
from Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics 
(Sidgwick 1874), and distinguished between 
on the one hand economics, which “investiga-
tes the arrangements between agents each 
tending to his own maximum utility,” and on 
the other hand politics and (utilitarian) ethics 
investigating “the arrangements which con-
duce to the maximum sum total of utility” 
(Edgeworth 1881, 6f and 15f). The two kinds 
of calculations is combined, however, in so 
far as the economic system can produce bet-
ter results than any other system, when 
measured by ethical standards, in this case 
the standards of hedonistic utilitarianism. 
 
These answers are not truly satisfying, how-
ever. The first part of the answer, the reduc-
tion of social motives to mere private prefer-
ences, involves an inappropriate blending of 
categories. People, who believe, for instance, 
that they ought to preserve reasonable living 
conditions for future generations, are acting in 
accordance with this belief, and not because 
they have some peculiar preference for the 
wellbeing of future people. ‘Obligation’ and 
‘preference’ are not concepts placed on the 
same categorical shelf. Obligations do not 
even have to involve sympathy the way that 
Hume supposed. The obligation towards non-
existing future generations shows this quite 
obviously. Nor can values be reduced to pref-
erences (Sagoff 1986 and 1988; O’Neill 
1993). Whereas preferences are basically 
subjective and accidental, values are inter-
subjective and related to arguments. 
 
The second part of the answer involves a 
contradiction in terms. If all social motives 
can be reduced to private preferences, why 
should economists’ motives be any different? 
Many cost-benefit analysts actually do as-
sume the presence of an obligation them-
selves, whenever they make their calcula-
tions, including calculations involving obliga-
tions towards posterity. As we have seen al-
ready, they are not content with referring to 
current people’s preferences about future 
generations, but seriously discuss a variety of 
ethical reasons, which can be given for and 
against treating future needs on a par with 
current ones. When doing this, however, they 
also implicitly deny that people are simply 
“rational fools” trying to further their own pref-
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 erence satisfaction. If this were the case, the 
economists’ inclusion of future needs would 
be an unjustified insertion of their own alleg-
edly accidental and arational preferences for 
future people.  
 
Cost benefit analysts easily end up with a 
similar contradiction in relation to political de-
cisions. On the one hand it is assumed that 
cost benefit analysis can help making political 
decisions more rational. On the other hand 
political decisions are assumed to be mere 
expressions of arational preferences, which 
should simply be recorded along with all other 
kinds of preferences. 
 
In order to avoid these contradictions, econo-
mists will have to accept – along with every-
body else – that obligations and values can-
not be treated as yet another set of prefer-
ences. As Pareto pointed out, the homo 
economicus, the self-regarding consumer, will 
have to be supplied by the more broad-
minded homo ethicus and, consequently, the 
homo politicus, the citizen concerned with the 
public good and the values and obligations 
related to this (cf. also Faber et al. 2002). 
This will affect cost-benefit analysis seriously, 
both empirically and methodologically. If it is 
realized that people seriously try to act in ac-
cordance with ethical standards, it will lead to 
empirical failures to treat them simply as self-
ish consumers in all affairs. Similarly, the 
methodology of cost-benefit analysis will have 
to be adjusted in order to take ethical ques-
tions seriously as such.  
 
We have already seen that the consumer 
model gets into trouble when dealing with 
critical and unique resources. The intuitive 
sense of this very much explains why many 
respondents in contingent valuation tests feel 
quite uncomfortable when “struggling with this 
money business” (Clark et al. 2000; cf. also 
Diamond & Hausman 1994). In particular, 
they question the idea that the social value of 
a non-marketed good, in this case a wildlife 
area, is depending on their own rather unre-
flected opinions and preferences, as well as 
the implicit assumption that this can form a 
proper basis for decisions about its future. 
 
The use of cost-benefit 
analysis 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is grounded methodol-
ogically in the private society conception, 
which sees society as a mutually beneficial 
aggregation of private consumers who all try 
to maximize the satisfaction of their own pref-
erences, whatever these may happen to be. 
The market is the basic model for social rela-
tions, and interventions in the market are not 
appropriate, unless some kind of failure ap-
pears, which cannot be dealt with otherwise. 
Even in these cases the market should be 
imitated as far as possible. The common 
good should be conceived of as nothing but 
the good of all, to use Rousseau’s famous 
phrase (Rousseau 1754/1974). 
 
However, society is something else, too. It is 
just as much a union of unions (families, as-
sociations, communities, nations, etc.) work-
ing together in a common effort to further the 
good life, the identification and refinement of 
which is one of society’s main tasks. Commit-
ment, equity, and quality are key concepts 
here. Seen from this angle the market is only 
one out of a number of types of social organi-
sations, each of which is appropriate for a 
specific set of purposes. Like any other kind 
of social organisation, it is in need of a per-
manent evaluation and justification. It has its 
strengths, but also a series of weaknesses, 
wherefore it should be kept within proper con-
fines. Wherever it can be shown to further the 
good life it should be applauded; wherever 
not it should be limited in a reasonable way.  
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 In the first conception, the private consumers 
(or should we rather say: their self-regarding 
preferences) are always considered sover-
eign – even in cases that cannot be dealt with 
properly by the market. Where markets fail, 
cost-benefit analysis moves in and estimates 
what would happen if, contrafactually, the 
market mechanisms were capable of doing 
their normal job.  
 
In the second conception, the primary agents 
in social affairs are the citizens, who are ex-
pected to take the viewpoint of society at 
large throughout their deliberations. Accord-
ing to this second conception one of the citi-
zens’ most important regular tasks is, in gen-
eral as well as in each particular case, to 
identify the borders between what must be 
considered private and social affairs respec-
tively.  
 
Some cost-benefit analysts tend to believe 
that the private society conception is an alto-
gether adequate image. Most analysts do 
seem to be aware of several of its shortcom-
ings, however, but consider it to be a reason-
able proxy, which can be used methodologi-
cally to enlighten and improve citizens’ and 
decision makers’ treatment of complex is-
sues. They recognize the need to take into 
consideration other concerns, which cost-
benefit analysis is not suited to deal with, but 
insist that many issues can be treated much 
more systematically by means of economic 
analysis.  
 
Even in cases, where impacts are difficult to 
monetise, cost-benefit analysis can deliver a 
framework, which makes it possible to deal 
with these issues in a systematic way. The 
U.S. EPA, for instance, argues in the follow-
ing way: “Benefit-cost analysis is not a pre-
cise tool that yields firm numerical results, 
rather, it is a general framework for more 
carefully accounting for the potential and var-
ied effects of government programs. Some of 
these effects can be quantified, whereas oth-
ers can only be assessed qualitatively. Some 
may be relatively certain, whereas others 
may be quite speculative” (U.S. EPA 2000, 
33). Despite all its weaknesses, the analysis 
does contribute to the decision making proc-
ess by way of its methodological grip on most 
significant components of an issues. 
 
On the other hand, critics do have a number 
of serious objections against the growing use 
of cost-benefit analysis in decision making, 
several of which have already been men-
tioned.  
 
• A basic problem is the confusion of con-
sumers and citizens. Social affairs are 
treated as private affairs. Political deci-
sions are treated as if they were market 
decisions.  
• Due to factors like lack of information, fal-
lacies and misconceptions, self deception, 
lack of clarity about goals and measures, 
individual preferences are seldom clear, 
continuous, or well-founded. Yet they are 
regarded as the sole basis for cost-benefit 
evaluations. 
• On the market decisions are taken indi-
vidually in a series, not collectively in a 
group (to use Sartre’s expressions). This 
often leads to problems of sub-optimality, 
as is well-known from examples like the 
prisoners’ dilemma. Yet it is assumed in 
cost-benefit analysis that common deci-
sions are aggregations of individual deci-
sions.  
• Non-marketed goods are monetised, even 
though several of these goods are kept 
away from the market deliberately, as is 
the case with human lives and unique re-
sources. 
• Equity issues are to a large extent ignored 
in cost-benefit analysis. This is the case 
with the baseline scenario as well as with 
the distribution of impacts. The institutional 
setup, which determines how the market 
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 works, is beyond critique. Wealthy per-
sons’ wants count more in cost-benefit 
analysis than those of poor people. 
• Cost-benefit analysis is unreliable in long 
term predictions due to the changes in 
valuation occurring along with the altera-
tion of the situations in which the valua-
tions occur. 
• All too often basic assumptions are hidden 
in a methodological framework, which is 
not easily seen through if one is not famil-
iar with economic analysis.  
• The scientific and quantitative presentation 
is seductive and deceptive, because it sig-
nals a higher degree of certainty than cost-
benefit analysis can actually achieve.   
 
As we have seen above, some of these prob-
lems can be reduced in various ways. As-
sumptions can be stated more explicitly. More 
emphasis can be put on sensitivity tests. Un-
certainties can be underlined. Qualitative 
components can be integrated in the analy-
sis. Problems of equity can be given a more 
prominent position. Yet some of the basic 
problems cannot be dealt with this way.  
 
Many economists argue that it is inappropri-
ate to criticise the use of cost-benefit analysis 
by comparing it with an idealised democracy, 
where everybody’s voice is heard equally, 
everybody yields to the best argument, etc. 
(cf., for instance, Boardman et al. 1996, 46; 
Turner 1979). Firstly, they point out, this is 
not how actual governmental processes 
works. The powerful interest groups are the 
ones who are listened to; power all too often 
overrules arguments. Cost-benefit analysis 
reveals the interests of less powerful groups 
and includes them in decision making proce-
dures. 
 
Secondly, even though each individual’s pref-
erences are seldom clear, consistent, and 
well-founded, the large number of people’s 
preferences included in the analysis tends to 
make up for this. What cost-benefit analysis 
can do is to give important hints to decision 
makers about proportions and priorities. If 
conclusions are fairly clear, even after a sen-
sitivity test has been made, this is in most 
cases a very good indication that the case in 
well-founded. 
 
Thirdly, even though monetisation of external-
ities is shaky business, it is important to in-
clude these estimates, because otherwise en-
vironmental benefits are easily forgotten. 
Without economic values on non-marketed 
goods, only the (often: high) costs of preserv-
ing goods like nature sites or reducing health 
risks are left in the quantitative part of the ac-
count. And accounts in monetary quantities 
often appear more convincing to policy mak-
ers than qualitative descriptions of phenom-
ena, the importance and proportion of which 
can be difficult to estimate. 
 
Finally, cost-benefit analysis has much less 
influence on decision making than the critics 
assume. It is difficult to identify just one deci-
sion made solely on the basis of cost-benefit 
analysis. Cost-benefit analysis should be con-
sidered as one among several tools, which 
decision makers can use. Other concerns 
may overrule the results of cost-benefit analy-
sis, or other tools may be more adequate in 
certain situations.  
 
This brings us right back to Aristotle. Method-
ology cannot replace ethical judgment. In the 
end ethical and political decisions have to be 
made on the basis on many at least partly 
incommensurable factors. Cost-benefit analy-
sis can often improve decision making due to 
its systematic treatment of the issue at hand. 
This is particularly true in relatively limited 
cases, which mainly include goods that are 
traded on markets. One needs to be very 
careful about its use, however, and even 
more so in more comprehensive cases, which 
involve several non-marketed costs and 
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 benefits, or where long time impacts play an 
important role. Cost-benefit analysis can be 
very seductive, indeed, and one of the main 
virtues a decision maker needs to have is to 
be resistant to its magic. 
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